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INTRODUCTION
O
ral histories represent the recollections
and opinions of the person interviewed
and are not the official position of
MORS.Omissions and errors in fact are corrected
when possible, but every effort is made to present
the interviewee’s own words.
EdgarBishopVandiver, III,wasPresident
of MORS from 1992 to 1993. In 1995, he was
elected a Fellow of the Society (FS). In 1995,
he also received the Vance R. Wanner award
given to amilitary operations research (MOR)
professional who is deemed to have played
a major role in strengthening the profession
of operations research (OR). In 2012, the
Military Applications Society (MAS) of
the Institute for Operations Research and
the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
awarded him the J. Steinhardt Prize recog-
nizing individuals for lifetime achievements
in theORfield. In 1984,Mr. Vandiver became
the second Director of the US Army Con-
cepts Analysis Agency in Bethesda, Mary-
land, which became the Center for Army
Analysis (CAA) in 1998 and moved to Fort
Belvoir, Virginia, in 1999. Mr. Vandiver re-
tired from CAA on November 1, 2012. He
is the first recipient of theMORSORLifetime
Achievement Award.
Mr. Vandiver’s original MORS oral his-
tory was published in Military Operations
Research, Volume 10, Number 3, in 2005.
Given his continued contributions to MOR,
follow-up interviews were initiated. The in-
terviews were conducted on January 29,
2016, March 20, 2017, and May 10, 2017 at
Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
The first follow-up interview session
was conducted by Mike Garrambone, FS,
and Bob Sheldon, FS, to fill in initial gaps
in Mr. Vandiver’s previous oral history
and address Mr. Vandiver’s unique per-
spectives from 2005 to 2016. This was
conducted at the Fort Belvoir Golf Club
in January 2016. Here, Mr. Vandiver ad-
dressed special events and specific CAA
achievements not covered in his previous
material. Reflecting on these thoughts, and
wishing to flesh out additional topics of
general OR interests, a second interview
was conducted in March 2017. This inter-
view was conducted by Mike Garrambone
and Bob Sheldon at CAA and addressed
the CAA proponents, interfacing organiza-
tions, development of analysts, interesting
people and personalities, and provided fine
descriptions of historical developments in
OR that only Mr. Vandiver could explain.
Because he contributed to and was a major
player in the development of OR, a third
interview was conducted along with Dr.
Michael Shurkin of RAND. This interview
was conducted in May 2017 at Fort Belvoir
and was to assist in gathering recent CAA
and other Army organizational OR history.
This interview centered on the roles and
missions of other Army analytical agencies,
significant studies and analytical support to
Army leadership, development of models
and study metrics, and the development
of future analysts. Dr. Shurkin has been
chartered by the Army to write Volume IV,
1995–2015 of the History of Operations Re-
search in the United States Army; the previ-
ous three volumes are available online at
http://www.aors.army.mil/history.html.
MORS ORAL HISTORY
Interview with Mr. E.B. Vandiver, III,
FS. Mr. Mike Garrambone, FS, and Dr. Bob
Sheldon, FS, interviewers
Bob Sheldon: It’s January 29, 2016, and
we’re at Fort Belvoir for a follow-up oral
history interview of Mr. E.B. Vandiver. Let’s
fill in a few blanks from your previous oral
history. Please tell us when you were born.
E.B. Vandiver: September 19, 1938. A
Monday morning, 7 o’clock in the morning
in the front bedroom of our house in Kennett,
Missouri. Dr. Paul Baldwinwas the attending
physician.
Mike Garrambone: This means you are
78 years old.
E.B. Vandiver: 77. I will be 78 this Sep-
tember. I was born at 7 o’clock on aMonday
morning—just in time to go to work.
Mike Garrambone: The real question
is, ‘‘How long have you been in federal
service?’’
E.B. Vandiver: I had 44 years of federal
service and I worked five and a half more
years, so I worked for 50 years.
Mike Garrambone: I believe you were an
Army lieutenant somewhere in there.
E.B. Vandiver: I was. I had a little over
two years of activeArmyduty as aChemical
Corps officer. I had seven years of Reserve
Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), which is
not counted in any of that, which is not a re-
cord, but it’s certainly better than average. I
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Two of those, I was actually in the Army Re-
serves, so we could add that on to the military
time. You could say it was 52 years, if you
wanted to. I worked for a long time, and I am
completely satisfied, and I have no desire to
ever work again or to ever run anything again.
I have not been paid a penny by anybody to
do any work since I retired.
Mike Garrambone: I understood you knew
something about field artillery?
E.B. Vandiver: I took field artillery in ROTC
at the University of Missouri in the late 1950s,
when we had branch ROTC. I had two years
of advanced field artillery ROTC, and I went
to summer camp at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. It
was a very thorough program. When I finished
ROTC, I was quite ready to go out and be a lieu-
tenant in the field artillery. But then, when you
got commissioned, youwent to the Officer Basic
Course for 20 weeks, so people that had gone to
field artillery ROTC, and then took the Officer
Basic Course, were extremely well trained at
the company grade officer level. However, it
was not to be, and I was commissioned in the
Chemical Corps.
Mike Garrambone: So I take it you have fired
a few shots?
E.B. Vandiver: I have spent some days on the
range in a 105 battery doing every job you can
do with the M101A1 Howitzer. That is, as a can-
noneer unpacking ammunition, in the fire direc-
tion center, as a forward observer, and laying the
battery. That’s orienting the guns: you lay the
battery with a surveying instrument and aiming
stakes and you get all the guns pointing in the
same direction. That’s laying the battery. That’s
the first thing you dowhen you go into position.
You’re doing every job in the battery during
summer camp. But I was not to be a field artil-
lery officer. At that time, my eyesight was not
good enough to be commissioned in the combat
arms (infantry, artillery, armor, combat engi-
neer, and aviation branches of the Army). They
wanted 20/20 vision or something close to it. A
few years later in Vietnam they got a whole lot
less picky about that, but at the time they could
afford to be choosy and that was the standard.
I had majored in physics. The combination
of poor eyesight and a scientific background
education meant I was assigned to be in the
Chemical Corps.
Mike Garrambone: You indicated you were
going to tell us about the work that CAA did af-
ter you moved it to Fort Belvoir.
E.B. Vandiver: CAA came to Fort Belvoir in
1999. We moved there in March and we dedi-
cated the building in May. I’d already been
the Director since 1984. By 2004, I’d been the
Director for 20 years, and I finally had the place
running about the way I thought it should. It
took all of 20 years. For those who think we
ought to rotate everybody every three years to
get them out of their comfort zone, and similar
nonsense, they don’t know that real institu-
tional building takes time and continuity. It
takes a long time to actually accomplish any-
thing in the bureaucracy. If you stay indefinitely,
nobody can out-wait you. You can eventually
wear down everyone who opposes you, and
you can get things done. It took me 20 years
to get it going right, so for my last eight years
at CAA I very thoroughly enjoyed myself, ex-
cept for a lot of the crazy stuff going on in the
Pentagon.
Mike Garrambone: You mentioned it took 20
years to shape or organize CAA to what you
wanted. What drove you to build this desired
structure?
E.B. Vandiver: It was not amatter of organiza-
tion. It was more to gain agency responsiveness
and quality of product. It was more a matter of
culture.
There are a number of things that I want to
emphasize about that period. I will talk about
support to operations, because that was a really
big one. But the one that I think I ammost proud
of was upgrading personnel and professional
development. I think we have the reputation
of having one of the finest professional develop-
ment programs of any organization in theArmy.
People wanted to come to CAA. Military offi-
cers, especially those in the functional area 49,
fought to come to CAA. If they had been here,
they really fought to come back. I had officers
there for their second and third tours. That is
still going on, still happening. A lot of them stay
to be civilians too. I lost numbers of personnel
over time. The size of CAA declined the whole
time that I was the Director. It was up near 300
when I became the Director, and by the time I
left it was half that size. Other people have
pointed this out to me with glee any number
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of times, and ‘‘it was all my fault.’’ But my con-
clusion on the thing was, if we’re going to be
smaller, we have to be better. To my way of
thinking about organizational management,
you either grow or die. That’s sort of the rule
in nature too—you grow or you die. If you can’t
grow in size, you have to grow some other way.
There are lots of dimensions to growth. One
way to grow is by having better people. You in-
crease capability by improving the people you
have. I adopted the philosophy that every time
we had to replace someone, we wanted to re-
place them with somebody much better than
the person that had just left. That sounds simple
and easy, but it’s extremely difficult to do. There
is tremendous opposition to that from the lower
levels of management, because they’re trying
to get a job done, and they want to quickly fill
a position so they’ve got an ‘‘in-place’’ worker.
I tried to inculcate in my managers that they
were not functionaries that just did what they
did, they were also part of the management of
the agency, and they had to take into account
how what they did affected the whole agency,
not just their little piece of the thing. That’s a
hard thing to get across.
The professional development I had the most
difficultywithwaswithmy seniormanagers—my
GS-15s and colonels, who of course think they
already know everything. It’s very hard to dis-
abuse them of this notion, and I succeeded with
some and failed with others. I would force them
to do things that they really didn’t want to do:
take courses, go to classes. Usually the reaction
I got to it was, ‘‘That was really good. I’m really
glad Iwent to that.’’ But therewere always a few
who said, ‘‘You wasted my time. I could have
been here doing studies.’’ About 80 percent of
the time, I got the right reaction. I ran a speakers
program where we had a speaker at least once
a month to bring in all kinds of different view-
points and try to get people to think about
things differently. I moved people around inter-
nally within CAA.
I sent people off to school. I top–down
loaded all long-term planning. You have to do
that. No division chief would ever send any-
body off for a year—‘‘I couldn’t possibly afford
to do without him.’’ But I could do that. So all
long-term training: Federal Executive Institute,
which was several months; War College, which
is a year; or some other things that were six
months to a year, I picked them and I sent them,
over the objections of my senior managers.
Then, when the person came back from the
course, they were much more capable than
when they left. I had a kid who was a top stu-
dent out of Virginia Tech in math and computer
science. He had a master’s degree but was to-
tally ignorant of history and many other sub-
jects. In fact, I had taken him to London with
me for the US-UK talks. We went to Trafalgar
Square and he said, ‘‘What was Trafalgar?
Who was Nelson?’’ And the same thing with
Waterloo Station, ‘‘What was Waterloo?’’ This
is a level of historical ignorance that is truly
mind-boggling. He was a very bright and capa-
ble kid. After I left, they sent him off to the Ma-
rine Corps University for a year. I saw himwhen
he came back and he said, ‘‘I had no idea how
ignorant I was,’’ because they cover a lot of mil-
itary history there. But those kinds of things,
you have to assign from the top.
Mike Garrambone:While you made it a point
to mentor your senior leaders at CAA, what lee-
way did you give them in conducting assigned
studies?
E.B. Vandiver: I usually would assign my
colonels and GS-15s mission-type orders. If I
thought the division chiefs would not do some-
thing crazy, I would allow maximum leeway to
that division chief to do good work for the
Army. A good example of that type of direction
was given to Andy Loerch when he formed
Force Strategy Division as a colonel, and it cer-
tainly paid off.
Speaking of mentoringmy colonels and GS-
15s, the one that caused the most consternation,
and the one I enjoyed themost, wasmy required
reading program for senior managers. I had
a management planning conference every
four months. We used to go over to Harpers
Ferry or we would go out to West Virginia
to a place—Capon Springs—and other places
up on the Blue Ridge, up to Big Meadows or
Skyland. We would just go for the day and talk
about, ‘‘here’s where we are now,’’ ‘‘here’s
what’s coming up,’’ and ‘‘here’s what we ought
to be focused on.’’ For each one of those periods,
I assigned a book that they had to read before
we got there. Someonewould then deliver some
kind of book report on it and we would discuss
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it. This just caused more consternation than you
can imagine.
Bob Sheldon: Can you give us some examples
of those books?
E.B. Vandiver: I certainlywill. I wrote a list of
six of them that I just remembered right off the
top of my head. The first one was The Checklist
Manifesto: How to Get Things Right by Atul
Gawande, which is a wonderful book, and
a checklist is a wonderful management tool. It
is a very simple book to read. We bought the
books for them, and you never heard such cry-
ing and wailing, having to read a book. I had
them all in the conference room this one time
and handed out the book and told them, ‘‘It
sounds like some of you guys haven’t read
a book since you were in college!’’ One of my
colonels, a Military Academy graduate, said,
‘‘Sir, you are assuming we read books in col-
lege!’’ Some of the others were The Black Swan,
a book called Wrong: Why Experts Keep Failing
Us—And How to Know When Not to Trust Them,
by David Freedman, which is very, very good.
It’s about why the experts are so frequently
wrong, and it’s about the biases that come into
studies. The two biggest ones, which are a real
danger in our business, are confirmation bias
and choosing the data. You see it all the time,
and you see it in the newspapers every day. An-
other book was How to Measure Anything, by
Douglas Hubbard. It’s very good and you’re
probably familiar with that one. Another one
was Poorly Made in China, by Paul Midler. Usu-
ally they’remanagement of some kind, or some-
thing that might be useful. Sometimes they’re
largely politically oriented, international rela-
tions. There’s another one about what it’s like
in India today. Things like that. I don’t think
they continued that one after I left. Many of
the other programs I instituted, they’re still go-
ing on. But they got rid of that one in a hurry.
Bob Sheldon: One of the books you rec-
ommended to me was The Boys in the Boat, by
Daniel Brown. Do you have a personal interest
in that topic?
E.B. Vandiver: I both rowed and cox’d (cox-
swained) crew at Culver Military Academy in
the 1950s, rowing on a four-oared shell for inter-
murals and backup cox on the junior varsity and
varsity eight-oared shells. (The coxswain sits
facing forward at the rear of the boat called
a shell. He steers, keeps time, and gives com-
mands.) The shells were Pococks, the best in
the world. Our coach had rowed for Princeton
in the 1930s, was independently wealthy, taught
fourth class (freshman) English (the hardest
course I ever took), and personally funded the
Culver Crew program.
Bob Sheldon: Was your experience as a cox-
swain good preparation for being the Director
of CAA?
E.B. Vandiver: Absolutely not. When the
cox gives a command, the oarsmen instantly
obey. When I gave a command at CAA, it was
considered an invitation to debate.
Mike Garrambone: How about a history
book?
E.B. Vandiver: There were a few. I frequently
had speakers cover historical titles, rather than
asking people to read about it. We were going
to management planning conferences, and I
tried to keep those pretty much focused on
management techniques. As a matter of fact, I
subscribed to a service that surveyed the man-
agement literature and provided reviews. It’s
a lot easier to read reviews than it is to read
books. I would read the reviews, and then I
would pick the most interesting ones. I would
also look at what the Economist magazine rec-
ommended, what the Washington Post’s Book
Week recommended, and I would read some of
them. If I thought it was worthwhile, I’d pick
that. I always read them first. There was a dozen
or so over several years, maybe 15 or 20.
The second area I want to cover is support
to operations and planning. I had people over
in Kuwait that helped to do the planning for
the 2003 campaign into Iraq. I also had an ana-
lyst up there in Baghdad supporting the head-
quarters starting in the summer of 2003, and
this continued thereafter. We had no involve-
ment in the original actions in Afghanistan,
so CAA was not involved in what happened
in 2001 and 2002. But we did get involved in
2003 and stayed involved thereafter. Our in-
volvement included providing analysts that
worked in the headquarters, doing analysis,
supporting them at CAA with reachback
(analytical support from their home station),
and coordinating the activities of a lot of differ-
ent organizations that were supporting opera-
tions by having a Friday morning operations
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coordination meeting, which incidentally is still
going on—in fact, there’s one going on right
now over at CAA. We worked very closely with
helping build up the Marine Corps’ analysis ca-
pability. Back in the beginning, the Marine
Corps used to say that they had fewer analysts
than the Army had analytical agencies, and ac-
tually I think it was true. But it changed over
time, and they built quite a healthy capability,
and I’m quite proud of having helped them do
that. We rotated people and did all kinds of
things. Those are the general things that have
continued to this day, not in Iraq—Iraq’s
gone—but there are still CAA analysts in Kabul.
Later on we expanded the program to other
headquarters and other theaters, beginning
with an analyst to the new Africa Command
that was stood up in Stuttgart. Then when they
arranged the Army component of that com-
mand down at Vicenza, Italy, we put an analyst
down there. Both of those programs have con-
tinued. And then we were supporting with
short-term deployments to headquarters over
in the Horn of Africa, and that has continued.
Since I retired, they’ve expanded it into the Pa-
cific, into a number of areas. So it changes over
time, and it always has the same kind of compo-
nents, the person on the scene provides analyt-
ical advice, assistance, does some little jobs,
reaches back for support fromCAA, which is al-
ways fairly easy to do now. It used to be diffi-
cult, but now it’s easy, relatively speaking. We
do other things and rotate the analysts through
there, and then when they come back to CAA,
they go to the group that was supporting them
to do the reachback, so they understand the
situation and the command milieu. That works
very well, it’s very highly developed, and it’s
continuing today. We developed and published
doctrine and procedures for operations re-
search support to operations in a handbook for
deployed analysts (Editor’s note: Deployed Ana-
lyst Handbook, 2016, is available at http://www.
caa.army.mil/CAA-DAHB-30AUG2016_FINAL.
pdf) and a short handbook for commanders
on how to use their analysis support. We
instituted a week-long training program for
deployed analysts, which was institutionalized
in the Army school system, and became a two-
week course, which we required all deploying
analysts to attend.
In July and August 2006, there was the war
between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. This
conflictwaswhere the IsraeliArmygot theirheads
handed to them. My deputy, Dr. Markowitz, fol-
lowed the war very closely and thought that
the way that they fought might be a harbinger
of future kinds of warfare. So he initiated some
investigations of that, and he asked me if we
should do this, and I said, ‘‘Sure. Go ahead.’’
Dr. Markowitz proposed a close study of
the conflict to see what changes should be incor-
porated into the tactical pre-processor level of
our two-tiered hierarchy (the COSAGE model)
to represent some of the new techniques of
warfare. (Note: COSAGE, the Combat Sample
Generator, is a division-level [e.g., multiple
brigade combat teams] stochastic simulation
model used to generate weapon system-level
attrition and expenditure data for use by a num-
ber of theater campaign models, including the
Joint Integrated Contingency Model [JICM].)
Working with the intelligence community, he
had a group develop a very detailed description
of the conflict describing each Israeli action by
force, time, and place, and the corresponding
Hezbollah counteraction. Dr. Markowitz says
this wasn’t a wargame, but I say it sure looks
like one.
I didn’t start this; Markowitz did. But then
once he had done it, and they started bring-
ing in results showing what these guys had
done over there, they didn’t see what I saw. I
looked at it and said, ‘‘It’s quite clear to me
that Hezbollah had taken every single military
advantage the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) pos-
sessed, and systematically developed a counter
to it, one-for-one, right down the line: opera-
tional, technological, tactical.’’ One way or
another they countered every operational advan-
tage the Israelis had, so they were able to defeat
the incursion. This is the kind of thing to which
the term ‘‘hybrid warfare’’ was applied. I created
a display: here’s the IDF’s advantage, and here’s
howHezbollah countered it.We developed these
ideas into a full briefing about hybrid warfare,
and we took it to everybody and his brother.
It made an enormous impact.
Then we extended it to other areas and
other operations. I think because of the opera-
tional mindset we had, we were able to recog-
nize what was happening and take advantage
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of it and disseminate it to other people. I think
that’s about all I want to say about support to
operational planning because a lot of it is very
highly classified, you can’t really talk about
the substance of it. As a result of this effort, we
also got into doing wargaming. I’ll talk about
that a little bit more in just a minute. But putting
analysts with operational headquarters and
having them provide support there, having
them reach back to a group at CAA, they could
support them on practically a real-time basis,
and then rotating analysts between those two
groups, is an extremely powerful concept, and
I think it’s been adopted by a lot of different
organizations.
We brought wargaming back to life in a big
way in 2006, becausewewere facedwith a prob-
lem we had no idea how to solve. We had a re-
quest from General Dubik (Lieutenant General
James Dubik) in Iraq wanting to know about
how to size the Iraqi Army and other security
forces for the eventual departure of the Ameri-
cans. At that time, we still planned to hold elec-
tions and then leave. How big should it be and
where should it be and how should it be consti-
tuted? We basically didn’t have any way of do-
ing that in our standard way of doing analysis.
So we put together a wargame to deal with that.
Dr. Markowitz was a big leader in this, and we
used what we had. First of all, we had a lot of
knowledge of the theater; we had data on the oc-
currence of violent acts against the government
and Americans. We had a great deal of data on
that. And we had Army doctrine that had been
published about how to deal with situations of
this kind and we had Dr. Jim Quinlivan’s re-
search at RAND. So between knowledge of the
theater, doctrine, and the data we had, we were
able to construct a wargame that would have as
one of its outputs, ‘‘here are the forces you need
of these different kinds in these areas’’ and then
sum it all up.
When we did the wargame, officers from
the theater came from General Dubik’s office
and participated in the thing. We had a secure
video teleconference (VTC) every night back
with the command, so we had ongoing feed-
back. When we were done, we briefed the thing
finally to LTG Dubik and the Iraqi Vice Chief of
Staff, an Iraqi four-star, and a roomful of gen-
erals on a secure VTC and then it was used.
We had worked out how to answer the
question posed by LTG Dubik commanding
the Multinational Security and Training Com-
mand, Iraq. The question required very specific
answers: how many people, how many bri-
gades of each type, and where forces should
be located by type. At the time, we didn’t know
it, but LTGDubik had asked two other groups to
come up with an answer. One was a standard
staff estimate that he had his own headquarters
do and for the third one he had convened a
group of graybeards to give him an estimate.
In the end, he used our work, because he said
we could explain how we got all the numbers.
It was briefed all the way on up to General Pet-
raeus, not by us, but we briefed his three-star
deputy by secure VTC, and then people in the
theater actually gave the briefing. General Pet-
raeus was absolutely delighted. He accepted it.
He was going to come to CAA to give us a com-
mendation for having done it, but it didn’t work
out that way. We got it anyway later. That was
a major event in the rebirth of wargaming, and
we did a long series of games on different ques-
tions in Iraq, and then we modified it and did
the same thing for Afghanistan, and we’re still
doing wargames. So CAA’s supporting a field
commander is one reason wargaming came
back to life, and we adapted it andmade it grow
and made it better as we went along. Earlier, we
had used a theater wargame to train new ana-
lysts, and we had subsequently used it for some
operational issues in Korea, but the Iraq games
provided the major impetus.
We used wargaming for a lot of things after
that and I talked at length about all the stuff
when I gave the keynote address at the MORS
Special Meeting on Professional Gaming in
September 2015. That’s only one tool, but it’s
one that is very useful, and that we use for quite
a number of things, especially front end anal-
ysis on new things. We ended up adapting it
and using it for all kinds of studies. We did
wargames on the Horn of Africa. We supported
the US Security Coordinator to Libya following
the liberation of Libya. Things like that. So we
have made use of wargaming for all kinds of
analytical efforts.
I want to talk about one of the biggest stud-
ies we did in the 2000s for Base Realignment
and Closure (BRAC-05). We were given extra
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people for several years. We were given four ex-
tra officers that we used for two years to go
scrub all the databases that would be used in
a BRAC. If you’re familiarwith classicalmythol-
ogy, this was ‘‘cleaning the Augean Stables’’
(one of the labors of Hercules in Greek mythol-
ogy). You cannot believe how bad these data-
bases were. Every installation would have one,
and then there were Army-wide ones, that were
fed off of the installation ones. We found very
quickly that we had to actually go survey on
the ground and compare that with what was
in the installation database, and what got fed
into the Army database. From our survey we
made the data more accurate. For example, we
would go look in the Army database, and it
would say, ‘‘Out at Camp Swampy, there’s
all of these buildings with office space, and
they’re all unoccupied by the government.’’
We would then go to Camp Swampy, and ask
for their database—ask their people, and they
said, ‘‘No, those buildings are all occupied.
We put contractors in all of them.’’ This was
very common. We spent two years scrubbing
the databases and going to all the major Camp
Swampys in the Continental United States,
and a lot of the minor Camp Swampys, and ver-
ifying their databases. Even after all of that, I’m
not convinced it wasmore than about 90 percent
accurate, but when we started out, I don’t think
it was even 50 percent. So that was our going-in
position. Then we provided two years of analy-
sis support to two different groups: one was the
Army BRAC-05 office and the other one was
Don Tison’s group on Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) headquarters and administra-
tive activities. Mr. Tison was the Deputy G8 at
the time. We did all the analysis for those, and
in the end, when you looked at the Army re-
commendations compared to what was finally
enacted, when you got to the very end of the
road, the Army and Don Tison’s group had far
and away the highest number of recommenda-
tions that were supported all the way through
the process. Somewhere up around 90 to 95 per-
cent. I think the Navy was around 60 percent,
and the Air Force was somewhere in between.
So again, the power of analysis is in being able
to credibly explain what you did, so people will
understand what was done. We had good data,
we had a solid methodology, and weworked on
the thing objectively. I was very proud of what
we did with that difficult assignment. We also
sent Mr. Rich Pedersen as a ‘‘deployed analyst’’
to the Pentagon, and he and his successors pro-
vided analytical support to where to put new
brigades (or deactivate brigades). This use of
analysis as a basis for stationing decisions has
served the Army well when challenged.
Another one of the things is I’ve continued
to emphasize all through my tenure at CAA is
the quality of analysis. There are a lot of differ-
ent ways to try to maintain quality. We had
our famous Analysis Review Boards (ARBs),
our own internal murder boards, of which
there’s at least two, sometimes up to four, on ev-
ery project. We used to think that the most im-
portant one was the last one—the famous
murder board. We finally came to realize that
far and away, the most important one was the
first one. Because if you don’t get it straight—
what you’re going to do and how you’re going
to do it—at the outset, it’s never straight thereaf-
ter. I always believed it was the last one, but it
turned out I was wrong about that. The first
one was the most important. It finally got to
where the last one was a sort of ho-hum; they
didn’t pay much attention to it, because the first
one was so important. We used to bring in the
Sponsor to all of them, and we’d have the mur-
der board at the end, and thenwewould be tear-
ing the thing to shreds at the end, and the
Sponsor was horrified. We then decided that
what we would do is bring the Sponsor to the
first one. That’s the one where we make sure
we’re going to do what he wants done, and then
we might bring them to an interim one, but we
didn’t bring them to the final one. After the final
one, we put together the final briefing and we’d
take that to the Sponsor.
Another way of improving quality was com-
peting for different prizes, and preferably win-
ning them. Now you have examples of ‘‘this is
what really good analysis looks like.’’ You can
show it. So when you go to people in schools, ju-
nior analysts, who ask, ‘‘How do I know what
good analysis is?’’ Well, here are some good ex-
amples. Look at these. The MORS Rist Prize, the
Wilbur Payne Award, and there are others. I
made a major push on competing for all of those,
and this got to my divisions, and they wanted to
have winners too. It kind of permeated down.
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I want to talk about MORS. In 2006, the of-
fice of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army
(Operations Research) (DUSA(OR)) went away,
and I inherited most of its analytical functions,
including being the Army MORS Sponsor. I
tried to be fairly active, and maybe too much
so, for the MORS office—they thought I was
too active—but that’s OK. I tried to go to all of
the symposia from then on, although I don’t
think I made it to all of them, due to other
reasons. I also want to talk about theMORS syn-
thesis group. I had created the first synthesis
group for the Analysis Lessons Learned Desert
Shield/Desert Storm minisymposium, which
we ran over at the Center for Naval Analyses
(CNA) in November 1991. We had plenary ses-
sions, and then we had six small working group
sessions. What I wanted to do was to make the
results instantly available to the community. I
had a senior member, Clayton Thomas, lead
a synthesis group. I had one individual for each
one of the working groups, and I had a total of
seven personnel for the synthesis group. They
would meet at the end of each day, and they
were crafting a briefing as we went along, so
that at the very end, the last briefing was Clay-
ton Thomas with the synthesis group, ‘‘Here’s
what we did. Here’s what we found.’’ That be-
came an article that went into the next Phalanx.
Those were the results, instantly available to
the community. I’m glad to see that has contin-
ued as a practice, but as time goes on, the natu-
ral tendency of things is to get more elaborate
and become less effective. It would help if peo-
ple would go back and read the results of the
first synthesis groupmeeting in 1991. I have rec-
ommended it to people on occasion. They will
see a way to do it that is fairly simple and
straightforward and very effective. This can be
found in the March 1992 issue of Phalanx, Vol-
ume 25, Number 1, titled, ‘‘Lessons Are Learned
from Desert Shield/Desert Storm.’’
With the demise of the DUSA(OR) office, I
also inherited all of the international activities
that Walt Hollis used to run, and the senior an-
alyst reviews for the quality control and pro-
gram review coordination within the Army. I
created a full-time office for the international
activities, with Bob Barrett and Sherry Palmer.
We had a coordination meeting every Monday
morning, and we went down the list of all of
the international meetings we participated in,
sponsored, andwhat-not, including their status,
just like the operations coordination meeting,
so that we kept all of these events on track. We
kept the participation up, and kept them fo-
cused on the things we needed them focused
on. The major ones were with the UK, which
was twice a year, home and away series. France,
once a year there and here, same thing with
Germany, same thing with Canada. And then
there were still some residual Quadripartite
activities, and some NATO activities and a few
other things, we had to keep all of those on track.
We also coordinated our MORS and Army Oper-
ations Research Symposium (AORS) activities
too. There’s always a million things that need to
be coordinated. They took care of that too. Bob
did a fabulous job. Sherry did a great job as well,
and she was telecommuting from Oklahoma and
still is. Bob just recently retired.
Sometime along the late 2000s, the Chief of
Staff, Operations wanted to divest himself of
the Modeling and Simulation Management Of-
fice. He came to G8 and asked if theywould take
it, and G8 asked if I would take it on and man-
age it. I said, ‘‘Yes, if that’s what they wanted
me to do.’’ So I inherited the Army Modeling
and Simulation (M&S) program and their sup-
porting activity of 40 people or so, and another
building. I ended up with another building to
run. I had two buildings on Fort Belvoir then,
and CAA still does today. It was an old barracks
building that was renovated as office space, not
as a part of BRAC, but as a part of something
else. Anyway, I got a fully renovated building.
It was a great place for me to hide sometimes,
because nobody could ever find me if I went
over to the M&S building. They had plenty of
empty offices there, because it was sized for
a much larger organization than we actually
put in there. But that took a fair amount of time
and attention, and I tried to integrate it more
in the support of analysis, because basically, I
thought the whole M&S structure in the Army
was ill-conceived to begin with and not well ex-
ecuted thereafter. It kind of took on a life of its
own. It did require a fair amount of my time
in my later years with CAA. But I think we
might have done some good there too.
I also worked with Forrest Crain up in Army
Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA)
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trying to create an Army Materiel Command
(AMC) analysis agency comparable to the
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
Analysis Center (TRAC) at Fort Leavenworth.
We wanted this to support all of AMC. We
had some bureaucratic knockdown drag-outs
in the headquarters, because there were parts
of AMC totally opposed to doing this and were
willing to fight to the death to prevent it. But
it was such a good idea that it eventually hap-
pened anyway. It does exist in a form, not as
elaborate as what we had in mind originally,
but I think it will grow into that.
Mike Garrambone: Is that different from
AMSAA?
E.B. Vandiver: It is ‘‘AMSAA Plus.’’ AMSAA
is still up at Aberdeen Proving Ground. But
AMSAA Forward is down with AMC Head-
quarters in Huntsville, Alabama. It has absorbed
some other related activities that are under
AMSAA control. It’s still AMSAA, but it’s get-
ting very close to the thing we had in mind.
It’s not quite as big as what we had originally
wanted, but it’s growing. They didn’t change
any names; it’s still AMSAA. He’s got a nice
little office down there in Huntsville that pro-
vides support to them as a conduit and it does
all kinds of good stuff too. That’s where retired
Colonel Chris Hill works. Forrest hired him to
run that organization. Forrest was stealing other
people from CAA to go down there. Now that
Forrest has CAA, he doesn’t have those people;
now they belong to AMSAA. But we’re all in
this together, so it’s okay.
In the last couple years before I knew I
wasn’t going to work too much longer, I tried
to summarize what I thought I’d learned about
different things. In 2007, I was asked to go to the
International Symposium on Military Opera-
tional Research (ISMORS) in England and give
the Ronnie Shephard Memorial Address. This
is a formal invited lecture, the only one I’ve ever
given, a named lecture. It was to be published
too, so I wrote it. Normally I just do briefing
charts and talk to them without writing text.
I wrote a text for this one. I went through 33
drafts on this, all summer of 2007 out on my
back deck, reading this thing out loud with the
birds squawking at me and squirrels throwing
acorns at me, telling me to stop, because if
you’re going to read a speech, it has to sound
right. The only way to get it to sound right is
to read it out loud. The last 10 or 12 of these
drafts were tweaks, to smooth out the transi-
tions and make it sound right. But it was done.
We went to the ISMORS and it was at
a stately English mansion out in the countryside
down near Portsmouth, which had become
a convention center, a meeting center. It had
buildings to live in and it had the old manor
house and meeting rooms and a pub. It had an-
other building with an auditorium in it. Mike
Baumanwent along; he said hewas going along
to heckle me, but he actually went along to pro-
vide moral support. I was glad to have him
there. There were a lot of young analysts from
European countries, and a lot of them were
young women, especially from the Netherlands
and Scandinavia and Germany. When we
would have our happy hour at the end of the
day (at 5 o’clock they opened the pub), Mike
and I would get our beers and go out on the
patio at this table to drink them. A flock of
these young ladies would come sit around us.
Bauman said that originally he was convinced
it was because we were babe magnets, but then
it dawned on him that the reason theywerewith
us is they felt safe. We’re a couple of old grand-
fathers, and they had all these other guys
around that were trying to hit on them. They
were safe with us.
Anyway, I did give the talk. I had given an-
other talk too. I gave my ‘‘A Deployed Analyst
in the Vietnam War’’ talk, which was very well
received too, just as a regular presentation. Then
I gave this one at night, and I prepared for it by
drinking some wine at dinner, so I think that
greatly contributed to the animationwith which
I read this thing. It went over fairly well. It is
published in its entirety in Phalanx, Volume 40,
Number 4, in December 2007, so people will
know ‘‘what did you learn out of all your career
in analysis.’’ Well, I refer them to that; a lot of it’s
in there. The title of it was ‘‘Keeping the Opera-
tions in Operations Research.’’ You’ve heard
that all through everything I’ve said here.
I did another briefing for a G8 management
planning conference. This was around 2010, be-
cause we’re coming out of Iraq, we’re really
drawing down fast in Iraq by then. People were
talking about reshaping the Army for the fu-
ture, and there was a lot of talk from the new
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administration about getting rid of all these use-
less overhead organizations and having nothing
but warfighters left, and blah-blah-blah. In 1992,
we had faced the same situation in the draw-
down at the end of the Cold War and the Gulf
War. In June 1992, the Chief of Staff of the Army,
General Gordon Sullivan, held a summer study
up at West Point for a week. There were three
groups: one looking to the past, one looking at
the current state of the Army, and another one
looking to the future. I had the futures group. I
wasn’t supposed to, but the person who was
supposed to couldn’t come, and I was his sec-
ond choice, but I got it. I had a room full of some
of the Army’swildmen andwild thinkers. I was
locked up with them for a week, and we figured
out, all right, now we can’t make any kind of
guess about what the future is actually going
to be. You don’t know that. But we do know
the Army is going to get smaller, so what we
can do is, we can talk about what to keep and
what to discard. That’s what we did. We started
with the Army as big as it was, and we started
coming down. We would come to break points,
and we would say that, okay, at this level, the
Army is capable of doing this. Then go to a lower
level, now the Army is capable of doing this. All
the way down to almost zero. So when you get
to the absolutely irreducible minimum, at some
point in there, the only thing you can keep is the
institutional Army, which has the ability to cre-
ate forces when you need them. This is that
‘‘worthless overhead’’ stuff. That’s actually the
most essential thing in the Army. We made
a very convincing case about all of that. Flash
forward to 2009 or 2010, whenever it was, and
we’re hearing all the same stuff again. ‘‘We’ve
got to keep the warfighters and get rid of all this
useless overhead.’’ So I called up to theWar Col-
lege, to the historians up there, and got hold of
Hal Nelson, who had been part of the history
group when we did this. I said, ‘‘Hal, I need
the report from the 1992 summer study.’’ I had
it within two days, a complete Xerox copy, they
had sent to me. I built a briefing for G8 about,
‘‘Okay guys, here we go again, and here is a dif-
ferent way to think about this.’’ I created a sim-
plified version of that, kind of updated, and I
gave it to the G8, and ended up briefing it all
over the place, to almost everybody and his
brother. I think it did a lot to stop this ‘‘Well,
we’ve got to get rid of all the useless overhead
stuff and keep only the warfighters.’’ I’m kind
of proud of what I did on that. Then I retired.
Bob Sheldon:What have you done since your
retirement? You didn’t just kick back and take
a long nap?
E.B. Vandiver: I retired in November 2012.
Mike Bauman announced early in the year that
he was going to retire, and that after he was
gone, it wasn’t going to be any fun. I kind of
agreed with that. So I went to his retirement in
May or June at Fort Leavenworth, and then he
came to mine in November. We both went out
at the same time. I had a few residual activities
at CAA, but they petered out pretty quickly. I
did get set up though to continue with CAA
as an unpaid Army volunteer as the CAA histo-
rian. I have an office jammed full of papers and
notebooks and stuff, so I actually pretty much
hold the CAA historical archives. I also look af-
ter the CAA museum. I have several projects
there. I still run the staff rides to the Civil
War battlefields; I do two of those a year: The
Wilderness andSpotsylvania andChancellorsville.
I’ve given a few lectures here and there, on one
thing and another. When I’m there, I have a lot
of people come by who just want to talk with
me. I counsel a number of other people also.
But I try to stay out of Forrest’s hair, try not to
meddle in the management of the place. I do
better at that now than I did early on. It’s not
easy letting go after 28 years, and I was pretty
disoriented for the first two years, but I got over
it. I am thoroughly enjoying not working. I have
not been paid a dollar by anybody for anything
since, so that’s good. I did have a special brief-
ing I wanted to put together for people that en-
capsulated a lot of thoughts I had on strategic
thinking and long-range planning and the value
of those. I’ve done that, and I’ve briefed it
around some, still give that to people now and
then. I think it’s a pretty nice piece of work. I
would like to give that at MORS sometime,
but I don’t know where it would fit in. It ought
to fit in someplace.
Bob Sheldon: Speaking of the Civil War, I
read The Fateful Lightning: A Novel of the Civil
War, by Jeff Shaara, and there was a part in-
volving a character named ‘‘Vandiver’’ who
fought under Sherman. Was this Vandiver real
or fictional?
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E.B. Vandiver: MG Vanderveer was real and
possibly a fifth or sixth cousin. Hewas originally
from the Vandiver homeland of Maryland/
Delaware but had moved to Iowa and became
a politician. Wikipedia has a good bio. There
is another General Vandever in the Western
Theater of similar background, but he didn’t
go with Sherman’s gang of war criminals. Every
family has black sheep.
Getting back to current day, we’ve got the
50th anniversary of the CAA coming up in
2023, so that’s not that far away. I’m going to
write a short history of CAA. I have in mind
about a 20-page pamphlet, really succinct, that
they could use for new people, new hires and
things like that. And then I’ve been involved
with the history of MOR in the Army, of which
we’re going for the fourth volume now. I’m try-
ing to assist with that. So those are the things I
still do with the Army.
With MORS, I still do what people ask me
to, like Mike Garrambone and his wargaming
group. I do go to the symposia, but mostly I just
go to the Past Presidents lunch, because I get
a free lunch out of that one. Sometimes I go to
the Board of Directors dinner, just for fun. I
don’t do very much in MORS anymore, but I
do like to do a few things. I really do like going
to the Past Presidents lunch.
Mike Garrambone: How does CAA keep its
history?
E.B. Vandiver: The main way we keep it is
with the annual report, which is extremely valu-
able and which they have fallen down on since I
left. That is one thing I do go harass themanage-
ment about, and that is being corrected. When
Dr. Shrader did the history of MOR, I just took
out whichever volume he was doing, then took
out the annual reports for that and said, ‘‘Here,
take these. And bring ’em back.’’ And he did. I
actually wrote a couple of the appendices in
one of the things. I was the only one that knew
the history of the AORS, so I wrote all that stuff
and got that part all documented. How does
CAA keep their history? The CAA annual re-
port is the main thing.
Mike Garrambone: The RANDArroyoCenter
is affiliated with the Army, but I have no idea
how.
E.B. Vandiver: It is the Army’s analysis
Federally Funded Research and Development
Center (FFRDC), like CNA is for the Navy and
RAND Project Air Force is for the Air Force.
That’s the short answer.
Mike Garrambone: Do they get their work
from you?
E.B. Vandiver:No. It comes out of Headquar-
ters Department of the Army. They’re supervised
out of Army Program Analysis and Evaluation
(PA&E), which is part of G8. They’re an FFRDC,
so they have a line ofmoney, and somany profes-
sional man-years. They propose things and the
Army proposes things. But that’s all run out of
a different office.
Mike Garrambone: You have made a point
several times about the data. I think your com-
ment was, ‘‘It’s not just out there sitting on the
ground.’’
E.B. Vandiver: There are a lot of misconcep-
tions about going to get the historical data. Peo-
ple think of it as on a bookshelf somewhere, and
here’s the historical data you want in volume
so-and-so, of this year, this one. It doesn’t exist
that way. There is no such thing. The historical
data, if you want to go to it, it takes a lot of work
on the part of historians and analysts to put it in
a useable form—particularly analysis data. You
have to build it as you go along. But for just the
history itself, you’ve got the Chief of Military
History, you’ve got the Army reports, and that’s
where the data are. And it has to be extracted for
any particular question or thing you want to re-
search. But again, there are a lot of misconcep-
tions about data. Like on current operations,
I’d say, ‘‘Well, what did we do about this?’’
And people would tell me, ‘‘Go down to the
Army Operations Center. They keep all the data
down there.’’ No, they don’t. They keep it for
two years and throw it away. So no, they don’t
have any idea what happened five years ago.
People that are doing current operations are do-
ing just that. They’re doing current operations.
They don’t care about anything that happened
before. Saving history is a never-ending job.
It’s very difficult.
Bob Sheldon: When you were the MORS
Army Sponsor, you were a zealot for oral histo-
ries. What are your thoughts about the value of
capturing oral histories for MORS?
E.B. Vandiver:Everything is new and nothing
is new. Everything is the same and everything
changes. The more things change, the more they
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are the same. People dealt with these problems
before. Theywere as smart as we are. They were
as experienced as we are. They didn’t know
what we know. The world had not done the
things that have been done since. So there is
a lot to be learned by a looking at the experience
of others. I think the oral histories are basically
our best way of capturing the history of MORS.
I’ve encouraged the program in MORS. I have
arranged for people to be interviewed. I have
suggested people to be interviewed, so that we
get different facets of analysis brought into it.
Some of the guys we would not have thought
of otherwise. They were not big movers and
shakers in MORS, but they had very valuable
experience in analysis, and they bring a different
view of things. The body of oral histories we’ve
got built up now I think gives us a pretty good
history. You know, that’s the data! That’s the
data! If you want to write a real history of
MORS, a narrative chronological history, read
all of those oral histories of the people that were
there around that time, what was going on,
what did they think about it at the time.
Mike Garrambone: I’m looking at the his-
tory of an organization, and I’m wondering,
‘‘Why doesn’t every organization have a history
person?’’
E.B. Vandiver: Yes, you need a historian, but
it doesn’t need to be a full-time job. Somebody
ought to have that responsibility.
Mike Garrambone: Are you talking about an
OR historian?
E.B. Vandiver: I’m talking about any organi-
zation. You need to record your history. I have
been very active in the church since I retired.
And I don’t know how many times the issue
comes up about something, and someone will
say, ‘‘Well, we tried that way back when.’’ Well,
who knows about that? Well, so-and-so has
a history of that. So that we try to figure out
what was done back then, because we don’t
have a really good history of that. So we’re al-
ways trying to figure it out. The church building
has sat there on the same piece of property now
for 52 years, and there’s only one person that
kind of knows everything about everything
was ever done with the building over time. I
don’t know how many times, every meeting
we have spent trying to figure out, ‘‘What
happened before?’’ If you have a proper history
program, you’re recording things as you go
along, with just simple logs and journals, it just
makes all the difference in theworld. You can go
back and figure outwhat has happened. Annual
reports are a good way to do that. So if you’ve
got somebody that’s in charge of doing that,
knowing they’re going to have to do that, finish
that annual report at the end of the year, will
have some motivation to make sure that feeder
material is collected, done during the year. But
we had a lot of systems in place to do that, if
you did it as you went along. The key to having
a good history is good record keeping.
I created a museum to keep people from
throwing stuff away. That museum is now one
of the coolest collections of junk you’ve ever
seen in your life. I have some of the only view
graph projectors left in existence anywhere in
the Army, and most people will say, ‘‘What’s
a view graph projector?’’ Come to my museum;
I kept three of them. And if anybody ever shows
upwith view graphs, we can project them. I also
saved a 35 mm projector and our first personal
computers (PCs). Some of those things are
worth a lot of money. I’ve been working with
the Army Museum System to make the CAA
collection an Army Museum ‘‘holding,’’ that it
will belong to them, but it will be on our prop-
erty, and it will be on their books, so nobody
can come in here and say, ‘‘Who needs this old
junk? Throw all that crap away.’’ Which is what
happenswith stuff like that. But I’ve got some of
the coolest stuff you’ve ever seen in your life.
I’ve got one of the first Apple computers, and
one of the first PCs they had at CAA, things like
that. Anyway, that’s another one of my projects
as the historian. As a matter of fact, most of the
things I’ve done since I’ve retired have had to do
with history. I studied a lot of history in school.
In fact, one of my minors was in history, which
is pretty weird with physics and math.
Mike Garrambone: You have a Carl Builder
room at CAA. What did he do?
E.B. Vandiver: Carl Builder was a very well-
knownRANDanalyst. Hewas famous for being
a very creative, out-of-the-box thinker. I knew
him well when I was working in the Army
Headquarters. When I became the Director of
CAA, I started a program for distinguished vis-
iting analysts, where I would bring in a top an-
alyst from somewhere else to spend the year
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with us, and they had to go to the ARBs. It was
a part of my trying to broaden people’s perspec-
tives. The first one was Carl and he spent a year
with me. I gave him a project on ‘‘How does the
Army play in the development of strategy?’’
What he did was he used that to develop his
concept of service cultures and wrote a report
for me, which he turned into a book that was
then published commercially. It’s in several dif-
ferent versions and studied in the war colleges,
and things like that. Carl Builder was a Naval
Academy graduate of the class of 1954. He had
a brother named Jim Winnefeld. Their mother
had remarried and one of the brothers kept
their father’s name and the other one took the
stepfather’s name. Jim Winnefeld retired as a
two-star admiral; he was Carl Builder’s brother.
Jim Winnefeld’s son was recently the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). He
did not go to the Naval Academy; he went
to Georgia Tech, and is a fraternity brother of
mine, my social fraternity, Pi Kappa Alpha.
The Winnefeld who just retired as the Vice
Chairman was Carl Builder’s nephew.
Within my distinguished visiting analyst
program, I also had Jerry Bracken from the Insti-
tute of Defense Analyses (IDA) for a year. I had
Allan Rehm, the Soviet OR expert, come for
a year from CNA. I had Richard Darilek of
RANDcome forwhatwas supposed to be a year,
and then it was going to be another year, then he
left halfway through it. Hewas the last one that I
had. I ran out of money to sustain the program. I
couldn’t keep it going. But that was one of the
things that I was doing. When I got to CAA, I
thought it was way too parochial. They needed
to learn more about the bigger world. So that’s
who Carl Builder was. If you guys ever see the
younger Admiral Winnefeld, he doesn’t know
any of that. I have not come across him, and I
was trying to make contact with him but I never
got around to it. I want to tell him about that,
and bring him to CAA and show him the
Builder room named for his Uncle Carl Builder.
Mike Garrambone: Do you ever have old
guys come to the building?
E.B. Vandiver:Oh, yeah.We actually have an
old guy’s lunch once a year. Now we’ve kind of
institutionalized it, making it the first Friday in
November. It was November 6 last year. We
decided to just always do it the first Friday in
November where that kind of works out, and
we’ll see how that works. We had nine or 10
come, some retired for a long time, some of
them barely dragged themselves there. And
we had others that wanted to come but couldn’t.
So we get together once a year. I’m going to try
to keep that going for a while.
Mike Garrambone: I recall you modeled a fa-
mous historical battle in one of your models at
CAA. What was the battle and model and what
did you learn from this? (I really liked this ap-
proach and used it to choose ‘‘Drive on Metz’’
for wargame training)
E.B. Vandiver: We had Trevor Dupuy build
a detailed historical database on two World
War II battles: The Ardennes on the Western
Front and the Southern Side of Kursk on the
Eastern Front. We simulated the Ardennes
Campaign in the Concepts Evaluation Model
(CEM) theater simulation and compared it with
the historical campaign. Some aspects matched
well but others were different. We analyzed what
was causing the discrepancy and modified the
modeling to create amore accurate representation.
We intended to do the same with Kursk, but cur-
rent wars got priority and it wasn’t done.
Bob Sheldon: What are your thoughts about
how the MORS Board of Directors has evolved
over recent years?
E.B. Vandiver: I’m afraid that because of the
conflict of interest provisions, we no longer
have the kind of Board of Directors that we used
to have. If you get a government person in there,
they have to take leave in order to participate,
which really curtails their participation. As
a consequence, we’ve had far more academics
and contract people available because they will
be supported by their institutions. The MORS
oral history program is aimed at getting a his-
tory of MORS, but more broadly, it tries to get
a history of ‘‘here’s what was happening in
OR at the time.’’ And with the loss of a lot of
the government people on that, you’re losing
that latter aspect. So you’ll still get a good his-
tory of what’s going on inMORS, but you won’t
necessarily get a history of what’s going on
in OR. We had a little bit of that problem in
the beginning anyway, because we weren’t get-
ting people who weren’t really very active in
MORS but were very active in the community
and added a different dimension. That’s why I
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recommended the ones like Ed Kerlin and John
Shepherd and a few others. I don’t think most
people would have thought to interview them
for the program. But they give a very valuable
and different perspective.
One time on the MORS Board of Directors,
we had the heads of almost all the major analy-
sis organizations. It was themost efficient Board
we ever had. People who are used to doing
things say, ‘‘Let’s go down the agenda and get
this thing done.’’Wewould have one-day Board
meetings. When I first came on the Board, Mar-
ion Williams was still the MORS President. It
was his last time, and we had a two-day Board
meeting. It consisted primarily of pole vaulting
over the mouse turds. If you have two days to
talk about things, and you have people who
don’t really have much responsibility for any-
thing, they’re quite willing to talk for two days.
But when we had a Board in the late 1980s that
had people thatwere used to running things, we
would finish even before the day was over,
and then head for the bar. Very efficient. Now
you’ve got a lot of academics on there, so that’s
even worse. The more you have people that are
not responsible for anything in the real world,
the more they like to come to things like this
and talk. I understand that Board meetings are
two-and-a-half days now. There’s nothing I can
do about that. That’s just a complaint. The agency
heads can’t do this anymore. And Forrest Crain,
he’s theMORSArmySponsor, so he can’t do any-
thing. You can try to get to the senior people, even
though we don’t have that many senior people
anymore in analysis. But if we did, they probably
wouldn’t do it, because they couldn’t take leave
to go do all these things.
Bob Sheldon: We could dig out the historical
data, because we have you as an example of
serving on the Board of Directors and President
of MORS. Were you voted in as a Fellow before
you became the Director of CAA?
E.B. Vandiver: I became the CAA Director in
1984 andwas inducted as a Fellow in 1995. I was
a MORS Fellow long before I became a MORS
Sponsor in 2006.
Bob Sheldon: So by the time you became
a Sponsor, you knew what was going on in
MORS?
E.B. Vandiver: I had been on the Board for 12
years, two terms and then the officer years, and
then Past President, and Advisory Director. I
had been on the Board 12 or 15 years before I
stopped doing that. So I pretty much knew ev-
erything about MORS by then.
Mike Garrambone: But you had a window of
time and you had support, so you could do
those kinds of things. Participation was allowed
back then.
E.B. Vandiver: It was not only allowed by the
Army, it was encouraged. But then the conflict
of interest provisions got stricter and stricter
and stricter, and you just couldn’t do anything
after a while.
Bob Sheldon: This past Saturday you went to
a memorial service for John Shepherd. We cap-
tured his oral history. John is one of two data
points I know where an Army Operations Re-
search/Systems Analysis (ORSA) had training
in tap dancing, and the other is you. Can you
talk about your tap dance training?
E.B. Vandiver: It was actually very little. For
some reason, this memory is so crystal-clear. I
can recount the whole episode. My sister and I
were home alone in the summer of 1945 because
my brother had polio. He was at Baptist Hospi-
tal in Memphis, Tennessee. We had a house-
keeper who came over and fixed our meals
and spent the night. But the rest of the time,
my sister and I, we just ran around town to-
gether. She was five years older than me, and I
was not quite seven and she was 12. I went to
her piano lessons. I went to all her lessons in
this, that, and the other. And one of them was
tap dancing. I can only remember this one time.
It was just crystal-clear, this big old two-story
Victorian rambling frame house, center hall
with stairway going up one side. On the left-
hand side was the room that they cleared for
tap dancing, and they had a table at the far
end of the room with a wind-up Victrola on
the thing with the big horn. I got to wind the
Victrola, because it was only good for one re-
cord, one song. Then you had to rewind it. There
were coat racks in the hall, and there were
benches in the hall. And they were in there do-
ing tap dancing. Lots of people back then took
tap dancing. It was a very common thing for
boys and girls. Of course, everybody wore taps
on their shoes anyway to keep from wearing
them out. When the lesson was over, my sister
wanted them to try to teach me some steps, so
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they did. The instructors were named Finney,
aman and awife. They taught the class and they
taught me three or four different steps, which I
learned, and which I would do sometimes later
at home. My sister would make me line up with
her and do these steps together. So now that’s
about the extent of it. I said I had very little,
it was not much training. But there was a little
bit of practice. I could have done it, but I really
wasn’t that interested.
Bob Sheldon: Youweren’t like John Shepherd
who had tap and ballet?
E.B. Vandiver: No, I had no ballet but I did
go to my sister’s ballet classes too. She was al-
ways going around the house walking heel to
toe and carrying a book on her head. And she
can still walk all the way around the mall heel
to toe, and I can’t walk across the room that
way. Because it’s one of the exercises I have to
do at therapy for balance. I can’t get across the
room.
Bob Sheldon: That background in tap dancing
was useful later on in the Pentagon?
E.B. Vandiver: That, and many other skills.
Bob Sheldon: You said you had some stories
about Gene Woolsey.
E.B. Vandiver: Gene Woolsey was one of the
great actors of the Century—of any century.
And, like many great actors, he had horrible
stage fright. You wouldn’t think so. But he
did. He was the dinner speaker at the AORS,
when Dave Hardison and CAA was putting
on the symposium, sometime in the late 1970s
down at Fort Lee. I was given the mission of
escorting GeneWoolsey, which was pretty fasci-
nating because he had lots of stories to tell. But
he couldn’t eat dinner. He couldn’t eat a thing. I
sat with him through dinner. When it was time
for him, he got up and did his act. He would lay
down on the floor, he’d jump up in the air, he’d
climb up on the table, he’d scream. It was a fab-
ulous performance. Then as soon as the thing
was all over, and we would all go downstairs
to hang around and drink, I had to take him
out to eat. I took him to a restaurant downtown,
and he had a giant steak. Thiswas like 10 o’clock
at night. He had a giant steak and he wanted to
stay and talk. I had to go to bed sometime, but I
was told to do whatever he wants to do. Finally,
about 1:30 or 2 o’clock, he said, ‘‘Well, that’s
good enough. Let’s turn in.’’ So I took him back
to his place. I don’t think anybody ever knew
about how much he had stage fright. He just
had a terrible stage fright. But I understand
that’s very common in the really good actors,
and that they’re always like that, no matter
how many times they do it.
Bob Sheldon: You said there are many Army
ORSAs who studied under Gene Woolsey.
E.B. Vandiver: Oh, yes, at the Colorado
School of Mines. He was in economics or some-
thing like that, but had a strong OR flavor. I
think you know many of the people who had
his program, where people had to go out and
get a real job with somebody and then actually
improve their process. Judy Grange is the one
I remember the most. She went to work in a ma-
chine shop. She learned how to run a drill press
and a lathe and a milling machine and all that.
Then she did a model of their workflow and
showed how they could make it more efficient.
She implemented it and it made money. That
was one of the really good ones.
Gene Woolsey would call me up about ev-
ery other year. ‘‘Van, I’ve got somebody you’ve
got to take. This is the best student I’ve ever
had.’’ I said, ‘‘Okay, what’s his name?’’ He’d
give me the name. I said, ‘‘Okay, I’ll put the re-
quest in.’’ Everybody wanted to try to get the
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) graduates.
So if I asked for one from Colorado Mines, they
said, ‘‘Sure, you can have him.’’ So then I had
one. And then two years later he called, ‘‘Van,
I’ve got somebody even better than last one.’’
‘‘Okay, what’s his name?’’ I got him and sure
enough, he was very, very good. The first one
was Patrick DuBois. The second one was Bill
Tarantino. And then he called, ‘‘Van, I got one
you’ve got to take. He’s better than any of the
other ones.’’ Every one of them is better than al-
most anybody. ‘‘Alright, I’ll take him.’’ He’s the
deputy here now—Steve Stoddard. He was the
last one. I never heard from Gene again after
that. Of course, we’re getting old, and I under-
stand he got sick. You know he was quite inde-
pendently wealthy. His family owned huge
ranchlands outside of Denver. He could do any-
thing hewanted to, and he did. But those aremy
Woolsey stories. He loved to say outrageous
things about how he loved police states, fascists,
cops ought to just shoot the criminals down in
the streets. But I mean, I think he just said that
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for effect. On the other hand, he may have actu-
ally believed it too.
Mike Garrambone: I want to take you back to
wargaming. It’s certainly in vogue right now. A
lot of people are funding this as a mechanism
to generate innovative thinking, and there are
agencies now tagged to make things happen
in wargaming. You were into wargaming before
wargaming was cool and you brought it to
CAA. What are your thoughts about that?
E.B. Vandiver: I started in wargaming back
in 1964, right here at Fort Belvoir with the Com-
bat Operations Research Group (CORG). I was
in the wargaming division with Bill Archer.
It was my Deputy Markowitz who actually
wanted to bring it back to CAA in the 2000s.
Of course, I certainly agreed, because we had
problems dealingwith certain issues in Iraq that
we didn’t have any way of analyzing. If you
have no other way on earth of dealing with a
problem, wargaming is good way to try to get
into the problem. We did a lot of wargaming
during Iraq and Afghanistan and it stood us in
very good stead and then we extended it to
parts of Africa.
The primary use for it now is in front end
analysis. ‘‘What is front end analysis?’’ OSD
and JCS like to come up with planning scenar-
ios. We want the Services to go to country X
and do this, that, and the other. These are the
kinds of forces you can have to do it—so many
divisions, so many wings, so many ships. That’s
the scenario. So now let’s go run it in the models
and generate the detailed requirements. That’s
a hell of a big step from that sketchy scenario
to the input data it takes to run the theater com-
bat model. Front end analysis is the way you go
from one step to the other. It is a wargame you
use to design a campaign. Now you have to de-
cide how we’re going to flow the forces into the
theater, where we’re going to send them, what
are the objectives we’re going to establish over
time, which forces are assigned to accomplish
which tasks, how are we going to support
this, what is the logistics support concept for
each phase of this operation over time and in
space. You work all that out in a wargame.
Then you can take these ideas and put them in
a combat model, run the thing, get the losses,
the consumption, the movement. And then
from that you can compute all of the logistics
requirements. It’s a very elaborate process, but
it’s also very systematic and very logical. When
you’re done you can explain—the reason why
we needed 15 truck battalions to support this
thing is because of the amount of stuff that
has to be moved, the distance it has to be
moved, and how it supports the fight. And that
works all the way back to the source, so you
have an exact audit trail for every unit. The same
thing is true of Total Army Analysis (TAA),
which is why our requirements hold up so well
inOSD.We can explainwhyweneed everything,
unlike some other Services that come in and
pound on the table and say, ‘‘We need it because
we need it.’’
Bob Sheldon: Did you bring in a lot of war-
fighter analysts and warfighter subject matter
experts for the front end analysis?
E.B. Vandiver: Dave Knudson, the gent with
the long scraggly Civil War style beard, ran the
wargames for a time and now does technical
support for them. He was here in CAA earlier
as a captain and then a lieutenant colonel, and
then a colonel, and then a GS-15. He’s still here
as a GS-15. He’s one of these guys that found
a home at CAA. We’ve got a lot of those here. I
was up at a director’smeeting the other day (I just
went in to harass them) and I looked around and
every one of the military there had been in CAA
as a captain or major. They keep coming back.
Dave Knudson would bring in all kinds of
people for these games. He brought in the Joint
Staff, he brought in people from the command
that will actually have to carry the thing out,
from all the Services, and he crammed them
all into that little wargaming room up there,
which I think is amajor health hazard, but that’s
a different issue. I think they finally put in
enough of an exhaust fan to where it gets toler-
able now. I had the wall moved out five feet and
modified the thing before I left. Actually I
didn’t; I had the plan put in place, and then they
did it after I left. So yes, we bring in all the
players. It isn’t just the Army doing it. We get
everybody in. We’re going to implicate every-
body in the crime.
Mike Garrambone: So you use wargaming in
your front end analysis? How is the sequence
formed?
E.B. Vandiver: The wargame is a structured
walk-through of the operation, phase by phase.
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It is conducted as a wargame, because you ad-
just it as you go along. You can say, ‘‘That
doesn’t look like a very good idea. Let’s try
something else.’’ For any kind of operation,
you can usually come up with two or three
pretty good concepts of the operation. So you
play those and compare them to each other
and you end up picking one, which may be
a new combination. You may come up with an-
other one in the course of it. Anyway, that’s
front end analysis.
On some of the smaller operations, where
you don’t want to set it up to run in a theater
model, the wargame will be the whole analysis.
And then you won’t do a troop list for the thing,
although it has been done in some cases. You do
a very simplified, kind of TAA calculation of the
logistics structure and consumption and other
requirements. So if they’re small enough, the
wargame can be the whole thing. But if it’s to
be put into a theater model, then it’s the neces-
sary step in order to set up and run the theater
model, and then hit the postprocessors.
Mike Garrambone: You were talking about
employing theatermodels. I know that you built
some of your own tools at CAA. How did that
come about?
E.B. Vandiver: There is a long history of that.
The whole history of the theater models at
CAA begins with ATLAS (ATactical, Logistical,
and Air Simulation), which was built by the
Research Analysis Corporation (RAC) for the
Army Strategy and Tactics Analysis Group
(STAG), which was the predecessor organiza-
tion to CAA. ATLAS was based on the original
theater combat model played at the Army War
College. It had a front line between the oppo-
nents and then it had assigned warfighting sec-
tors. The forces fought in the sectors and the
front line moved. Over time, these things were
derogatively called ‘‘piston’’ models, but there
wasn’t anything better at the time. So that’s
a later criticism. But it was very limited in the
things it could do, and the assessment mecha-
nism in it was based on World War II experi-
ence, which got increasingly out of date. It was
okay originally. If you’ve got experience, you
use it. If not, you use something different. So
you come to the early 1970s and the Army
wanted to do a study called the Conceptual De-
sign for the Army in the Field (CONAF). John
Shepherd talked about this in his MORS oral
history. That required a theater model that was
more flexible than ATLAS. So RAC was tasked
to build that model. Phil Louer was the project
manager and John Shepherd was his primary
programmer on the thing. They set out to build
it. Then in the early 1970s, the Army panicked
and withdrew the funding for RAC. Congress
assaulted the federally funded research and de-
velopment centers (FFRDCs), although at that
time, they were called federal contract research
centers. Only the Army panicked and got rid of
theirs. Nobody else did. The other Services
just hunkered down and rode it out. But the
Army panicked and got rid of RAC. The resid-
ual program passed to a contractor, General
Research Corporation. Then about the same
time, CAA was stood up, and it subsumed the
old STAG, and in fact was stood up in their
old building on Woodmont Avenue. So the
CONAF model then transitioned to CAA. This
is what John Shepherd was talking about. After
a while it was renamed the CEM. That’s the or-
igin of the CEM. The CEM lasted for some 20
plus years or more. Then, ‘‘everybody’’ said,
‘‘It’s almost 20 years old. It’s an antique, rusty
and moth-eaten.’’ Nonsense! It was a different
model every few years. That’s the kind of criti-
cism that comes from total ignoramuses. But
we heard a lot of that. And there are more than
a few ignoramuses around, as youmay have no-
ticed.
Then we had the RAND Strategy Assess-
ment System (RSAS). They were building a the-
ater model that became JICM. It had very
flexible features. It did not have rigid sectors.
It ran on a network format, rather than a set of
rigid sectors, and it had a lot of other desirable
features. So I put $2 million or so into bringing
it up to standard and doing validation so we
could use it. And some version of that is what’s
being used today.
We retired the venerable model CEM, but in
the meantime, we had also built the Force Eval-
uation Model, which was a more advanced ver-
sion of CEM, but it was far more complicated,
data hungry, and didn’t provide much of an ad-
vantage over CEM. It was used in the late 1980s
for a few years.
Mike Garrambone:And these were all theater-
level models.
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E.B. Vandiver: Yes. These are all theater-level
models, and they were all primarily designed
forNATOversus theWarsawPact environment.
I think we got pretty good at modeling that,
showing how that war would go, based on all
of the very happy assumptions that were being
made. Although people suddenly started get-
ting more realistic about that when a book came
out—The Third World War: August 1985 by
General Sir JohnWinthropHackett—which ver-
bally played out a scenario. That was a real eye-
opener to people about ‘‘This is what would
happen if we actually had to do one.’’ Everyone
thought we’re never really going to do this. This
was all sort of fiction, and the plan was we’ll
fight like hell for three or four days, and then
we’ll blow up the world. This was the strategy
at the time: mutual assured destruction. We’ll
fight like hell and give it the old college try,
and then we’ll blow up the world. Then people
began to think, ‘‘Maybe that’s not such a good
idea. Maybewe ought to actually be able to fight
them to a standstill, and then not blow up the
world. That might be a better idea.’’ So we got
serious about studying NATO and bringing in
new capabilities, and we did hugely increase
the capabilities. Especially during the Reagan
administration, we really poured money into
it. Of course that was part of the Reagan strat-
egy, to spend them into the ground, which ap-
parently was done with some success.
Mike Garrambone: We’re wrestling today
with the difference between a campaign-level
model and a theater model.
E.B. Vandiver: That’s a distinction without
a difference. All theater models represent cam-
paigns, but maybe several campaigns in a the-
ater too, not necessarily just one campaign. In
some theaters, there’s only one campaign. So
it’s really just an artificial distinction.
Bob Sheldon: Getting back to history, you
sponsored some history books on the history
of Army ORSA written by Reg Shrader. Now
there’s a follow-on version of that being worked
by Dr. Shurkin from RAND. What are your
thoughts about catching Army ORSA history?
E.B. Vandiver: Actually Walt sponsored the
three volume History of Army OR. I was a major
participant in it. I identified source material,
people to talk to, and recommended them to
Reg Shrader, an excellent professional historian.
Walt asked the Chief of Military History to do
the history. The Chief of Military History said,
‘‘We don’t have anybody that can do this, but
we can hire somebody to do it.’’ Walt said,
‘‘Okay.’’ So they contracted and hired Reg
Shrader, whose specialty was actually the medi-
eval church. But he was a superb historian,
a professional historian. I think I was probably
the main source for providing historical mate-
rial, things to look at, people to interview. And
I wrote a number of the appendices for some
of the books. I wrote the history of the Army
OR Symposiums (AORS). I did the research
and wrote that piece, because I know how to
do historical research too. I reconstructed the
whole history of AORS, which was something
of a job. In fact, there’s a funny story. The first
AORS they had, they took almost verbatim
notes of the thing, and theminutes are very long
and very thorough, and they explain exactly
why they did it, who was there, and everything
that was said. And then at the end of the thing,
they had a big discussion about, ‘‘Well, should
we have another one of these?’’ They all agreed
that, ‘‘Well, there’s probably enough material
for one more. But then that ought to do it.’’ That
was sometime around 1962 and it’s still going.
It’s just like theMORSEducation andProfessional
Development Colloquium, which I thought was
a one-time thing when I first did it in 1986, and
it is still going on.
Mike Garrambone: I am going to the MORS
2017 Education and Professional Development
Colloquium at Annapolis tomorrow. You
started it and I’ll be there for the 32nd EPD. I be-
lieve the Colloquium idea took.
E.B. Vandiver: While I was MORS Vice Pres-
ident for Professional Affairs, I thought it would
be a good idea for those teaching OR and other
related disciplines at the various academies,
graduate schools, and civilian institutions to
discuss their curricula, training interests, and
programs at a MORS sponsored gathering. I
was also interested in what the analytical
agencies had to say about what they wanted
graduates to know when they arrived on the
job. I had no idea the Colloquium would catch
on and continue to be an annual program with
theplanning requirements and status of aMORS
special meeting. It is good to see that it moves
each year among the educational institutions
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and that it now includes student presentations,
career field discussions, and special topics such
as deployed analysts, useful analytical tools,
and educational opportunities.
Bob Sheldon: Will there be any difference in
the flavor of the ORSA history book being writ-
ten now compared to the other three volumes?
E.B. Vandiver: That remains to be seen.
Michael Shurkin is a very good professional his-
torian. He listens very well; he’s very attuned to
our concerns in portraying things. I provided
him all the source material that I know of, and
recommended all kinds of interviews for him.
Mike Garrambone: Do you think the histori-
cal material is out there to be found?
E.B. Vandiver: In some ways, yes; in other
ways, no. Because so much stuff takes place
electronically now, it doesn’t necessarily leave
a lot of tangible records. This volume covers
the period from 1995 to 2005. You don’t want
to go too close to the present, so it may be 1995
to 2010. I’m not sure of the exact time frame.
You don’t want to get it too current. That’s
whywe cut off at 1995 in the earlier one, because
the other stuff was too recent.
For CAA, I made sure things got docu-
mented. I’ve got my history of support to the
theaters books. I think you’ve seen those. I made
everybody document their tour of duty in Iraq
and Afghanistan, kicking and screaming, by
the way, and I kept all kinds of other records,
particularly in the annual reports and the an-
nual State of the Agency address, very pomp-
ously named, every fall. To let you know how
much a creature of habit I am, I did the first
one in 1992 and the last one in 2012, and never
changed the format. It was kind of good, but I
would add stuff and take stuff out, make some
parts more elaborate or less elaborate. But each
year’s had the same shape. Here’s what we did
last year, and here’s what we’re going to do next
year. The first thing we worked on was the
Army’s most important problem. What were
the Army’s most important problems for that
year?Well, they are listed. Then you can go from
that into the annual histories and find the pro-
jects that are actually related to that project.
For CAA, it was very well documented. For
other agencies, Shurkin tells me he’s had diffi-
culties in that some keep better records than
others.
Bob Sheldon: Such as AMSAA and Leaven-
worth folks?
E.B. Vandiver: He’s been dealing with all of
those. But I don’t knowwhat he’s found orwhat
he’s doing with that material.
Mike Garrambone: In a similar vein, where
would you look for research done by the early
agencies, like the Operations Research Office
(ORO), CORG, and RAC? Where do you find
the studies they did?
E.B. Vandiver: They were all archived. They
are all in the Defense Technical Information
Center (DTIC), or whoever DTIC is today. And
they were all archived in the Defense Logistics
Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) at Fort
Lee, Virginia. They were all archived in all of
those repositories. When I was still working at
CAA, people would occasionally ask for some
old CORG study. They would call it up, print it,
and send me a copy of it, at some expense. If
they’re all still there, I don’t know. The ORO
and RAC studies, they were all archived too,
when RAC went out of business in 1973.
Mike Garrambone: But these are not solely lo-
gistics studies, are they?
E.B. Vandiver: No.
Mike Garrambone: They’re any type of oper-
ational study or maybe even a unit history.
E.B. Vandiver: Unit histories are a different
genre altogether.
Mike Garrambone:Maybe I’m thinking about
organizational origins or background.
E.B. Vandiver: Every agency in the govern-
ment is supposed to file an annual history with
the Chief of Military History. Some do; some
don’t. They’re kind of sketchy. I would just send
them my annual report and say this is mine for
the year, and that was quite adequate. But I re-
member when I was on the Army Staff; we all
had to put in input for our annual history that
went over to the Chief of Military History. I
don’t know what they do now.
Mike Garrambone:You did a lot of interesting
things here, but sometimes you did indepen-
dent in-house research. Can you tell us about
some of those?
E.B. Vandiver:One of the things I did at CAA
back in the early days was to establish a way for
people, who said they had these great ideas for
doing research that nobodywould ever let them
do, to get it done. What I did was establish
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a CAA internal research fellow.Nowyouwill be
relieved of all duties other than this project for
however long you think it’s going to take, up
to a year. You have to submit a proposal—a de-
scription of what you’re going to do, what it’s
going to produce, and why you think it’s useful.
At the end of the thing, you have to produce a re-
port and give a briefing on it. The first one was
by Dr. Bob Helmbold, who wanted to do some-
thing on combat movement rates. He did a giant
compendium of everything known aboutmove-
ment rates of forces in warfare. It was very use-
ful in formulating how we represent movement
in theater models. That was the first one. And
then there were several others after that. (Bob
Helmbold later retired and moved to Arizona,
and has never been seen since.) Some were use-
ful; others were really not. After a few years, no-
body applied for independent studies anymore,
so that was kind of that.
Mike Garrambone: You might have fire mis-
sions too, and special assignments?
E.B. Vandiver: If we had an urgent need for
something, we didn’t do the research. We just
dove into it. People have a bad habit of asking
us to do things we didn’t know how to do.
There’s two ways you can respond to that.
One is, ‘‘We don’t know how to do that.’’ That’s
a good way to get your agency killed. Or, ‘‘We
think we can do it, but it will take three years
and you’ll have to give us a lot of money.’’ Well,
that’ll get you killed too. And the third one is,
‘‘Yes, sir!’’ We’ll do something, and it may not
be very good the first time, but it will be better
later. So just dive in and do it. When we first
went over to Korea, when General Robert Ris-
Cassi was the Commander in Chief (CINC, an
older acronym used for a four-star combatant
commander) there and the four-star, we had al-
ready started with his predecessor General Lou
Menetrey, whom I had already known back in
the Pentagon, doing an assessment of their Op-
erations Plan (OPLAN), because it was 20-
something years old at the time, and Lou
thought that would be a good idea. We kicked
it around. So we did the study at the very end
of 1990, and in 1991 we went over to Korea to
brief it, but now Lou had left and RisCassi was
there. The day we got there was the day Desert
Storm began. My family is still convinced to this
day that I did not go to Korea, that I had gone to
Saudi Arabia for that, and they still don’t be-
lieve me. But I can document that I was actually
in Korea when that went down. Anyway,
we briefed RisCassi on it and he was just to-
tally fascinated with the thing and he said, ‘‘I
want to use revising this OPLAN as a way to
drag this command here and the ROKs into
the modern era. So I want to do a whole new
OPLAN. You’ve done this evaluation of the
old one, and it’s good. I want to look at a lot of
variations and a lot of different ways to do
things. Can you do that? And how long would
it take?’’ I said, ‘‘Well, since we’ve already done
this piece of work, I think we can have some-
thing for you in about 30 days, maybe a little
longer. It depends on when you need it, and
how much you want done.’’ So we kind of
negotiated that. What I found out later is he
had asked his internal analysts to do this job,
and they told him it would take nine months.
He said, ‘‘Thank you’’ and never asked them
to do anything else for him. The lesson is this:
anything a three- or four-star general asks you
to do, the answer is: ‘‘Yes, sir.’’ No ifs, ands, or
buts. They don’t expect perfection. They just
expect you to give it your best. That’s the les-
son I learned a long time ago. Don’t argue with
them; just say, ‘‘Yes.’’ That also works for your
marriage.
Bob Sheldon: Last timewewere here at CAA,
you took us through your museum. Do you
have any new acquisitions in your museum?
Are you looking for any?
E.B. Vandiver: I would like to get some new
acquisitions, but I haven’t been searching be-
cause I’ve been out withmy legs since sometime
last year I could barely walk. And then I got the
knee replaced, and I’m just now learning to
walk all over again, which is interesting since I
think this leg is a little longer than the other
one. I’m having balance problems, so the short
answer is ‘‘No.’’ But I’ll get back to it one of
these days.
Mike Garrambone:You never seem towork in
a vacuum. Obviously, you have to work with
OSD and the Joint Staff. What’s that like?
E.B. Vandiver: It depends entirely on who’s
there.Most of the time, it works verywell. There
have been periods where it didn’t work well at
all. But only one that I can really think of.
Mike Garrambone: Is it a data thing?
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E.B. Vandiver: No. We had a chief analyst in
OSD PA&E, the head of the thing, that really
didn’t believe in analysis, for a period of time.
It was a little hard to deal with. But other than
that, we have gradually, I think, greatly im-
proved the way the Services interact with OSD
and the Joint Staff, primarily because of the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in dueling
analyses. The analysis we did for the 1996 QDR
pretty well sank the OSD/JS analysis. So after
that, they said, ‘‘No more dueling analyses,’’
and they established the Analytical Agenda,
which I thought was a great blow for sanity
and rationality. They would standardize scenar-
ios, models, and databases. Over time that has
evolved and has become the standard way of
doing things. They have that whole data struc-
ture up there now that is headed by an ex-
CAA guy. There’s all kinds of ex-CAA people
up there running this thing. Then Tom Allen
was the top analyst in JS for a long time, so of
course we could work great with him. Years
ago, it was pretty adversarial, but now I think
it’s fairly cooperative. Except we had that one
bad patch.
Bob Sheldon: You talked about the Carl
Builder room. What will be the E.B. Vandiver
room here at CAA?
E.B. Vandiver: It’s going to be the room next
to Forrest’s office, the little parlor room. I called
it the parlor because it had a couch in it and I’d
go in there and nap in the afternoon. I would en-
tertain visitors in there and if I had a visiting
three- or four-star and they needed a private
place, I’d give them that room. That room
served all kinds of purposes. I’m going to give
them all my memorabilia and stuff, and they’re
going to coat the walls with it—including all my
MORS stuff and everything else that I want to
get rid of that nobody in my family wants. At
least that will be my room for a few years until
somebody comes along and says, ‘‘Throw all
this old junk away.’’
Bob Sheldon: It will go to the museum at that
point?
E.B. Vandiver: Who knows. Someone will
say, ‘‘Get rid of all this junk.’’ That’s why I want
all this to become a holding of the Army
Museum collection. Then nobody can throw it
away. I’ve already worked out the agreement
with the Army Museum. Under a holding, the
artifacts are kept and maintained by an agency,
but they are under the regulations of the Chief
of Military History—the Museum branch of it.
They can take parts of them and use them for
themselves if they want to, or they can leave
them right there. Whatever. But nobody can
come in and say, ‘‘Throw this old junk away.’’
I’ve got two or three view graph projectors in
there. There’s not a view graph projector left
in Washington now that I know of. When was
the last time you saw a view graph projector?
I asked one of my young analysts, ‘‘Do you
know what a view graph projector is?’’
Nobody knows. I’ve got 35mm slide projectors,
very high end, superb optics, and expensive at
the time.
Bob Sheldon: The E.B. Vandiver room will be
near the Colonel James Baird conference room
at CAA. Do you have any comments on Colonel
Baird?
E.B. Vandiver: Jim Baird was a US Military
Academy grad and a Georgia Tech-trained
ORSA. He worked for me in Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) as a
major and came tome as a colonel running ama-
jor division at CAA. At age 49, he died of a heart
attack one Sunday evening.We named ourmain
conference room for him.
Mike Garrambone: When I was teaching at
Army Logistics Management College (ALMC,
now Army Logistics University), I wondered
why would they put the study of OR in the Lo-
gistics Command and at Fort Lee? Why did it
end up there?
E.B. Vandiver: Weren’t you on the faculty
down there? When were you there?
Mike Garrambone: I was there in the 1980s.
You graduated my graduate school OR class at
the Florida Institute of Technology (FIT) back
then. But I never figured out how OR education
got into a logistics institution.
E.B. Vandiver: They had a small OR de-
partment and curriculum in ALMC that goes
way back years. At least back into the 1960s,
almost to the time Bunker Hall was built.
They taught the course in OR that was the
forerunner of Operations Research/Systems
Analysis/Military Applications Course-One
(ORSA/MAC-1).
Mike Garrambone:Was this for the loggies in
Logistics Command?
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E.B. Vandiver: Loggies like OR. They like
to do inventory control. They were one of the
early practitioners of OR. Remember, it’s the
ALMC, so in the Management division they
had an OR branch that taught OR courses.
Now you come along to 1977 and General Shy
Meyer is theDCSOPS of theArmy, and hewants
to greatly increase the number of ORSAs in the
Army, so we wanted to increase the ORSA
throughput. We can’t do it quickly through
NPS and Georgia Tech, and places like that.
But we can do it by sending a lot of students
to MAC-1, and making it a bigger and stronger
course. So that’s what we did. So we had the
first one of those which graduated in October
1977 and Shy Meyer was the speaker at the
graduation. At 5 o’clock that afternoon, he
called me. I was the tech advisor at DCSOPS at
the time. He said, ‘‘Van, old buddy, I’m sup-
posed to do the graduation speech down at
ALMC tomorrow. I can’t make it. Would you
go do it for me?’’ I said, ‘‘Yes, sir.’’ I had no
idea what to do or what to say or anything.
So I went home and I got a bottle of scotch
and cigarettes and by midnight I had outlined
my talk. So I got up the next morning and drove
down there early and got to graduate the first
MAC-1 course.
Mike Garrambone: So that’s how it got to
ALMC?
E.B. Vandiver: Yes. But the idea was, ‘‘Okay,
these are shake-and-bake courses.’’ This is not
adequate. So we said that to be a fully qualified
in ORSA, you have to either have a degree in OR
or have a technical degree of some kind from
somewhere plus attend MAC-1. That took
a few years to sort out. Of course, the personnel
people wanted to say MAC-1 is good enough.
You don’t need anything else. I said, ‘‘No, we
can’t have some of our brain surgeons go to
medical school and some of them don’t. They
all have to go to medical school.’’
Mike Garrambone: So you had a shortage of
OR folks?
E.B. Vandiver: We did, and we had a ‘‘get
well’’ program where we had to increase the
number greatly over a fairly short period of
time. LTG Noah chaired the thing. I think he
was the Army PA&E back then (PA&E was the
proponent for ORSA at the time). We had all
these categories (this was in the 1980s; I was in
CAA) when we tried to greatly increase the
number of ORSAs. General Max Thurman,
when he became the Vice Chief of Staff, decreed
we’ve got to have a lot more ORSAs. That’s
when we scrubbed the requirements. There
was no discipline in the requirements. Anybody
could code for anORSAposition. And out in the
commands, the commanders like to do it, be-
cause they knew they were going to get a smart
kid. So you had a lot of ORSAs in the four-star
and three-star command headquarters, which
actually wasn’t all that bad either, because they
tended to be right up there with the top guys
and they got valuable experience. We didn’t
have any control over that. And then we had
all the requirements in the agencies. Because
those higher-level ones had priority, they got
filled first and the agencies were sucking up
the deficit. So we had this expansion program.
We did all kinds of things. We increased the out-
put, the throughput through MAC-1. We sup-
ported the FIT graduate school program in
ALMC. We took a bunch of technical warrants
and turned them into ORSAs by sending them
to MAC-1. I actually had one of those at CAA
who worked out quite nicely. It was a typical
Army program. We can get 10 here and we
can get 30 here and we can get 15 here and six
here. And you add them all up and it comes
up to a pretty good number.
Bob Sheldon: The military is always accused
of wanting to fight the last war and analysts
have guilt by association of wanting to analyze
the last war. You grew up in the Vietnam War,
but your brain evolved in the 1970s.
E.B. Vandiver: Nobody wanted to analyze
the Vietnam War. When it was over, everybody
wanted to forget about it. I would regularly
bring up during the 1970s and 1980s, ‘‘Shouldn’t
somebody be studying counterinsurgency?’’
And the answer we invariably got is, ‘‘We’re
never going to do that again.’’ Well, I’m a stu-
dent of history. I said, ‘‘You don’t know that.’’
‘‘Oh yes we do. We’re never going to do that
again!’’ So the time came when we finally have
one we had to deal with, we found out we don’t
know anything about it. We have forgotten ev-
erything that was learned in Vietnam. But fortu-
nately, one person had continued to study it,
almost all of that time, all by himself, and that
was at RAND. That was Jim Quinlivan. If it
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weren’t for him, nobody would ever have done
anything. So we were able to use Quinlivan’s
work, his research, as part of the basis for some
of the stuff we did.
Mike Garrambone: You had talked before
about Don Hall. Who was he?
E.B. Vandiver: Don Hall was my last boss at
the CORG. He was the division chief and I was
one of his branch chiefs.
Mike Garrambone: Was he one of your
mentors?
E.B. Vandiver: Yes, he was one of my early
mentors. Hewas awonderfulman. He had orig-
inally been a senior analyst up at the predeces-
sor to AMSAA at Aberdeen Proving Ground
and was hired by CORG to be a division chief,
alongwithWes Curtis who had been another di-
vision chief of the Ballistic Research Laboratory
(BRL)Weapons Systems Laboratory, which later
became AMSAA. It stayed in the same building
the whole time and it’s still there. But they ren-
ovated it very nicely.
Mike Garrambone: Pete Reid would know.
E.B. Vandiver: Yes, Pete would know the his-
tory. I think the history is pretty well laid out in
the History of Army OR.
Mike Garrambone: Can you tell us about
Abraham Golub?
E.B. Vandiver: Abe had been one of the five
directors of the thing at BRL. He had been hired
by Wilbur Payne when he became—it wasn’t
called the DUSA(OR) originally. Back in the
McNamara days, the Army decided, ‘‘We’ve
got to have some analysts of our own to fight
these guys up in OSD Systems Analysis.’’ So
they created an analysis group in the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Financial Manage-
ment. I forget what the exact name of it was,
but they hired Wilbur Payne to come down
and run the place. Wilbur hired two people to
try out to see who would be his deputy, and
one of them was Abe Golub from BRL. The
other fellow was Dr. Dan Willard, who worked
with Wilbur on the faculty with him teaching
physics at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University (VPI). Wilbur had been a phys-
ics professor at VPI. Dan Willard was another
one down there. Dan Willard was indepen-
dently wealthy. His grandfather had been pres-
ident of the B&O Railroad, and he had gone to
Yale and got a PhD in physics and he was going
to have a career in academia.Wilbur got his PhD
in physics from Tulane University. He was go-
ing to have a career in academia. Then Wilbur
was hired for reasons that I don’t know into
OSD Systems Analysis, and the Army hired
him away from OSD. And then he hired Dan
Willard and Abe Golub. Well, Dan Willard was
very well suited to academia. Abe Golub was
a bureaucratic in-fighter. An alley fighter. So
he became Wilbur’s deputy and then Abe hired
me to work for him. Abe became the first scien-
tific advisor to the Assistant Chief of Staff
for Force Development (ACSFOR) when it
stood up.
Mike Garrambone: You mentioned Wilbur
Payne a couple of times. There’s a connection
between Dr. Payne and LTG John H. Cushman
that I’d like to explore.
E.B. Vandiver: Yes, I knew them both. LTG
Cushman spoke at CAA and I recommended
you invite him to speak at MORS on wargam-
ing. I attended his session at a MORS Sympo-
sium at the US Marine Corps University
at Quantico in 2010. It was an outstanding
presentation.
Mike Garrambone: Yes, and we invited LTG
Cushman to speak at our Heritage Session
at the 81st MORS Symposium in Alexandria,
Virginia. There he talked about wargames in
Korea while he was the I Corps commander.
He related the story of General Vessey telling
him to verify those games. LTG Cushman went
on to say, ‘‘They sentDr.Wilbur Payne, a gaming
expert, and Colonel Reed Davis to Korea to
bless our games.’’ This is documented in a
MORS Limited Edition publication (Operational
Wargaming in Korea 1976–1978, 81st MORS Sym-
posium Heritage Session, 18 June 2012), but can
you tell us about Dr. Payne’s side of this story
and his relationship with LTG Cushman?
E.B. Vandiver: The event is correct and be-
cause the games were very important and there
were political ramifications about them, Gen-
eral Vessey wanted the games to be reviewed
by well recognized and knowledgeable analysts
andWilbur and Reedwent to Korea to do the re-
view. Wilbur verified that LTG Jack Cushman
was a character, and he found that Jack’s war-
games could be put on a sound analytical foun-
dation. Wilbur called him ‘‘Crazy Jack’’ because
of his passionate enthusiasms.
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Bob Sheldon: Not too many people in MORS
remember Jack Walker. Can you tell us some
stories about Jack Walker?
E.B. Vandiver: Jack was a West Point gradu-
ate, an engineer officer. He went into Omaha
Beach at D19. He fought all through the Euro-
pean campaign. After the war he went to
work—I think—first for RAND, and I think he
got involved in MORS through RAND. You
didn’t get an oral history of Jack? I think you’ll
find in a Phalanx somewhere, there’s a bio of
Jack. (Editor’s note: See Phalanx, Volume 31,
Number 1, March 1998.)
You guys can get me something out of the
Phalanx. Remember my article I wrote about
brainstorming? I think it was in 1994. (Editor’s
note: SeePhalanx,Volume27,Number3, September
1994.) That’s the one where I created the famous
graphic of brainstorming, in which I have a
graph—totally accurate—of the results of a brain-
storm as a function of the IQ of the group. And
this goes from zero to 200, or something like that,
and this is a perfectly straight line; at the top is
a brainicane, and this is just an ordinary brain-
storm here in the middle, and down here you get
a brain drizzle. I had names all along. I think I’ve
got a copy of it in my office. I had a lot of fun writ-
ing this thing. You know, if you’re going to get
decent results out of a brainstorm, you need to
get some people there that have some brains.
That’s the thesis. One of the guys at the Engineer
Strategic Studies Group published an article in
the next issue or the one after that, which pro-
posed corollaries tomy scheme. He had one over
here where you got a much higher effect than
you would expect out of a low IQ group, and
over here you got a much lower one then you
would expect. And he had really cool names
for that one. One was the Edsel effect. You’ve
got a lot of brains, but you turn upwith an Edsel.
And this one is you’ve got a bunch of dummies,
but you end up with a great outcome. This was
the Serendipity Effect. It was really clever. I’ve
got a notebook with everything that I ever pub-
lished in Phalanx, which is quite a bit of stuff.
Mike Garrambone: How do you value the
FFRDCs, university affiliated research centers,
and the defense contractors? With regard to
CAA and MOR, how do you relate to these dif-
ferent types? Are they all just kinds of defense
contractors, in a way?
E.B. Vandiver: I have had a lot of problems
with some contractors, and I’ve had problems
with FFRDCs over the years. But in general,
I try to work with them. RAND took over the
Arroyo Center from the Jet Propulsion Labora-
tory of Cal Tech (JPL). I got to where I worked
with them very well. And I’ve gotten along
with IDA too pretty well over the years—still
do—and they do research that’s useful and we
engage them to do research for us. So I think
that’s worked out very well. Contractors—I
buy contract services myself, but only certain
kinds, not analysis. I didn’t buy analysis from
contractors. I used them to help build models,
and I’ll explain that ‘‘help’’ in a minute. And
do research, like a lot of the historical research
was done on contract. Any time I wanted to
do historical research, I could go to Andy
Marshall and he would give me the money for
it, because he thought that was a fabulous thing
to do too. I had money of my own to spend too,
sometimes more, sometimes less. I always had
projects lined up. Here’s something: there’s
always money somewhere. There is always
money somewhere. A lot of it is earmarked for
this, that, or the other; and it can’t be spent for
anything else. So I always made sure that I
had two lists and two sets of projects, that if
we got a big decrease in money, these are ones
we’re going to eliminate. But if therewasmoney
available, here are executable ones. There is al-
ways money looking to be spent, and if you’ve
got executable contracts, sometimes it’s yours
for the asking. Some years I picked up two or
three million dollars. A lot of times those would
be research contracts, historical research, model
research areas, things like that, would be in that
category of the add-ons. Now the decrements, I
tried to pick things that would do the least dam-
age if you had to cut them back. I tend to not
want to eliminate anything, but decrement
a whole bunch of things. If you keep things
alive, there’s always money somewhere. Money
comes, money goes. So if you don’t kill it and
keep it alive, you can add money later, bring it
back to life, revive it.
Bob Sheldon: You mentioned contractors
helping to build models.
E.B. Vandiver: The biggest mistake a govern-
ment agency can make is to want a model built,
and contract for it to be built. The contractor
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now has an instant incentive to never finish the
damn thing, because they want to keep it going
forever. ‘‘Well, wouldn’t you like to have this,
that, and the other?’’ ‘‘That would be nice.’’
The price goes up, the schedule slips. It goes
on and on. Nothing is ever really produced, so
everybody gets tired of it, cancels it, and you
start over again. When I wanted to build
a model, and we did this in three years, and in
each case, we had a contractor assist my in-
house team, who’s going to build this model.
That assistance is going to be very substantial,
but we’re going to be in charge of this thing.
I’m going to have two people on it, and then
we’re going to have this contract. Andwe’re go-
ing to finish this thing in three years. And we
got it done, because we’re just going to contract
one year at a time to do the next increment, and
we’d have those all laid out in advance. We’d
build it, we’d test it, we’d do the next increment.
And when we’re done, we’d have a working
model. We did that first on our new transporta-
tion strategic mobility model. Then we did it on
a mobilization model, and then lastly, we did it
on a replacement for Force Analysis Simulation
of Theater Administrative and Logistics Sup-
port (FASTALS)—the model that generates the
support force. It’s called FORGE (Force Genera-
tion). FORGE is still being used; Steve Peterson
down the hall. Retired Colonel Steve Peterson,
who is still doing TAA since he came to CAA
in the early 1990s. Steve Peterson, NPS gradu-
ate both an ORSA and a School of Advanced
Military Studies (SAMS) graduate, and a loggie.
A fantastic combination of capabilities: ord-
nance and ORSA and SAMS. If you want a his-
tory of people doing analysis, building models,
Steve Petersonwould be a great one to get while
he’s still alive and not retired. He’s getting up
there.
Mike Garrambone: It seems to me that
you’re always chasing new things. What was
your relationship with the research and devel-
opment (R&D) and test and evaluation (T&E)
communities?
E.B. Vandiver: We closely related to a lot of
stuff in T&E. For one thing, Walt Hollis was so
deep in T&E. That was his real area of expertise.
It was through Walt that we got dragged into
all kinds of T&E stuff. We would help the
T&E community with analysis processes, for
the design of experiments, for analyzing the
data, for running models in advance to develop
test designs, things like that. But not so much
here as at AMSAA and TRAC. I just got into it
personally because Walt would drag me along
to all these things. We didn’t do much here at
CAA on it ourselves, other than using the re-
sults. I still find the reluctance of analysts to
want to use real data puzzling. The OR curricu-
lum at schools got so academic, so math ori-
ented, they really got away from its roots.
These things are really supposed to represent
something in the real world, rather than the fe-
vered imaginations of some analysts. I would
find analysts of my own that just didn’t see
any reason why we should actually be using
real data. They would say, ‘‘Hey, the model
works. It gives good results.’’
Mike Garrambone: Was there anything else
that we missed in developing young analysts?
E.B. Vandiver: Well, we certainly liked the
analysts that came out of Gene Woolsey’s pro-
gram, who knew what analysis was first-hand.
If you had to understand the process up close
and personal, and you had to collect your own
data—Woolsey said, ‘‘Don’t trust any data you
didn’t collect yourself.’’ You can’t really do that,
but it’s a hell of a good motto. I wish you could.
But at least you can be careful about the data
you use.
Mike Garrambone: You said that about Viet-
nam data. You collected your own when you
were there.
E.B. Vandiver: Yes. We collected our own in
1966. It was kind of squishy, subjective stuff.
Some of it was numbers and incidents and sim-
ple stuff. Histograms and frequency of occur-
rences, intensities, and things like that. But
most of it was more subjective as to what the
commanders thought about this, that, and the
other. How important they thought that dif-
ferent things were. But you’ve heard my talk
about deployed analysts in Vietnam. I won’t
go into that, although I love to give that talk.
It’s my favorite.
Mike Garrambone:You probably have at least
one or two significant events that happened on
your watch that you could tell us about.
E.B.Vandiver:Yes, first of all, going toVietnam.
That was a very significant formative event. I’ve
told every analyst since then, ‘‘Go to a real war.
MILITARYOPERATIONSRESEARCH SOCIETY (MORS) ORALHISTORY PROJECT: A FOLLOW-
ON INTERVIEW OF E.B. VANDIVER, III, FS
Military Operations Research, V23 N1 2018 Page 81
You cannot believe what a screwed up mess it
is unless you go see it for yourself.’’ Because
you read the history books, it all looks kind
of neat and clean, but there ain’t nothing neat
or clean about any of it. It’s just a God-
awful mess. I think everybody that has gone
to the war and come back has said, ‘‘I see what
you mean.’’
While I was here at CAA, the most signifi-
cant event was doing analysis on real opera-
tions. Desert Shield and Desert Storm served
as the real breakthrough for this. I think you’ve
read my speech about putting the operations
back in operations research.
Mike Garrambone: Was that kind of an in-
coming Pentagon phone call one day?
E.B. Vandiver: No. It was nothing of the
kind. I went over to the building and elbowed
my way in. The last person they would have
thought to have invited in was an analyst. But
I just forced my way into it, because this is what
I wanted to do. I got in early with the planning
group over in DCSOPS. I told them, ‘‘Look, I
have already started wargaming this scenario
and we’ll have results for you at the end of the
week, for the first games.’’ The group didn’t
meet during the week; it met on the weekends.
The war started; I started them wargaming.
We had already set that scenario up and had
gamed it earlier in the year for Third Army in
Atlanta. So I already had a leg up on it. We al-
ready had the data, the scenario, and the maps.
So we started off wargaming the first week, and
then we continued wargaming the second
week. At the same time, I had another group
bringing the theater combat model CEM up on
the same scenario. By the end of the third week,
I think we shut down the wargames and start
running cases in CEM. By then, the DCSOPS,
who was General Denny Reimer, was very
taken with this. So we would go over to brief
him, and he’d say, ‘‘Okay, now do this, that,
and the other.’’ Now, unbeknownst to me, he
was taking our view graphs and faxing them
over to General Yeosock, General Schwarzkopf’s
number two guy. And Yeosock was writing
questions and sending them back. And then
Denny would call us and, ‘‘Here’s what I want
you to do next.’’ So we were supporting the
theater and didn’t know it. So that was the real
breakthrough of putting the operations back in
operations research. I had my briefing that I
did at the end of that and presented it at the
MORS Symposium in June 1991.
The third one, that I almost quit over, was
putting CAA under G8, that is, creating the G8
and putting CAA under it. Before that, I’d
worked for the Chief of Staff’s office. I hadmade
up my mind that I was going to leave. In fact, I
had already talked to some people. I had op-
tions. Then LTG Ben Griffin came out, and I told
him, I’m leaving. I think G8 is a bad idea and I
think putting CAA under it is a bad idea. And
I’m leaving." Ben said, ‘‘Oh, don’t leave over
this. It isn’t worth it. What can I give you so
you’ll stay?’’ I said, ‘‘Okay, I need this, I need
this, I need this.’’ He said, ‘‘Okay.’’ I love Ben
Griffin. It was because of him that I stayed.
I’ve known him since he was a colonel.
Mike Garrambone: Who is Ben Griffin?
E.B. Vandiver: General Benjamin Griffin was
the first G8. He later became the AMC com-
mander, the four-star at AMC. This is in 2002,
2003. I used to talk to Ben Griffin when he was
the AMC commander. I’d go over and take
him out to lunch on his birthday. I’d say, ‘‘I’ll tell
you the truth. I don’t want anything from you,
and you can’t do anything to me now. You need
to talk to me and I’ll tell you what I think about
things.’’ We had a great time. I still call him on
his birthday every year, down in Texas, where
he’s out riding the range. He’s a cattle rancher
now. Ben Griffin was the first G8, and he put it
together, and he’s one of the finest leaders I have
ever seen in my life. I had him domy retirement
ceremony.
Mike Garrambone: For the benefit of our sister
Services, can you tell us what G8 is?
E.B. Vandiver: DCSOPS was considered too
big with too wide a range of responsibilities,
all the way from being the backup to the Chief
in the tank in joint actions, to overseeing all
the force development and force structure. So
they took DCSOPS and they took PA&E and
they re-sorted them into a new G3 and G8. G8
was the rebirth of the Assistant Chief of Staff
for Force Development (ACSFOR), which had
gone away in the Steadfast Reorganization in
1972–1973, when they had to downsize the staff.
Nothing ever goes away in the Army. It just goes
around. Look at me. I have lived long enough
now to watch the forest succession out in my
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backyard. In a forest, over time the old trees die
off and the undergrowth grows up and becomes
the new forest. And there are certain progres-
sions that are fairly well-known. That forest of
this, this, and this will be replaced by one this;
and then it will be replaced by another. Well
I’ve been watching that going on in my back-
yard. And I’ve watched in my neighborhood.
My neighborhood looks about the same as it al-
ways did. It just keeps evolving over time. But
nobody’s the same. It’s like one of these horror
movies, where everything looks the same but
everybody’s different. If you live long enough,
you get a keen appreciation of how things
change over time that you can’t see in a shorter
period of time. But boy you can sure see it in
a long period of time. We’re the last family in
the development where I live that are the origi-
nal owners of the house. Everybody else, they’re
all new. They keep turning over, and they’re get-
ting newer and newer. I just sit down on the
front porch and watch it. I claim I’m the neigh-
borhood watch. I just sit out there and watch
the neighborhood.
Anyway, G8 was the re-creation of ACSFOR.
I considered it a bad mistake. I don’t think
they’ve entirely corrected it yet, but they’ve cor-
rected some of the worst parts of it. And I
thought putting CAA under it was a terrible
idea, and I still do. Forrest has made the most
of it by dealing directly with the Vice Chief of
Staff of the Army a good part of the time. That’s
more like it should be.
Mike Garrambone: I’m trying to get a feel for
some of the intense things that occurred on your
watch. That was one of them.
E.B. Vandiver:Yes, thatwas the third one—the
creation of G8.
Mike Garrambone: Before that, you were
aligned with the Chief of Staff. But I believe
you’ve always worked for the Army Staff?
E.B. Vandiver: Right, and originally CAA
was put under DCSOPS. Well, it was under
ACSFOR. ACSFOR went away in 1974 and
CAAwent under DCSOPS. Then the study that
Dave Hardison and I did, called the Review of
Army Analysis, in 1978 recommended that
CAA be put under the Chief of Staff’s office to
support the whole headquarters. That was ac-
cepted and that was done and we reported to
the Director of the Army Staff. It used to be
the Secretary of the General Staff, then they
changed to the Director of the Army Staff. It
was under the Director of the Army Staff from
1979 to 2002. I think that worked very well. I
stayed in touch with all of the major staff ele-
ments. I attended the Director’s meetings for
DCSOPS, DCSPER, DCSLOG, and R&D—their
weekly staff meetings. I went to all of them.
But there was just such an enormous difference
between DCSOPS and the others. The others
were so narrowly functional. It was useful,
and we did some things for them, but we were
too broad and too oriented to the DCSOPS kinds
of questions. And many times the DCSOPS,
when they turned it over to the DCSOPS, or
whenever they turned over one of the princi-
pals, I would go to them and explain, ‘‘I’m the
Director of CAA. I work for the Director of the
Army Staff. And I’d like permission to attend
your staff meetings.’’ They always said, ‘‘Yes.’’
But somehow or other, that didn’t happen with
Schwarzkopf when he was the DCSOPS. I had
known him when he was the ADCSPER and I
used to have lunch with him in the mess regu-
larly when he was a two-star. Then he became
the three-star DCSOPS, and I thought he knew,
but he didn’t. He thought I worked for him.
That was kind of a little bit of a comedy. Any-
way, we got along pretty well, in fact, we got
along very well.
Mike Garrambone: I know you have done
a lot of briefings. But you’ve also had to listen
to a lot of briefings. How do you negotiate all
of that hearing, that is, listening to all those
briefings? I bet you’ve listened to thousands of
briefings.
E.B. Vandiver: I would say it’s more like tens
of thousands, easily. Some are better than
others. There is a theory that experts actually
do pattern matching. And I tend to believe that.
With one of my own ARBs, I can just listen for
a little while, and I know whether this is good
or bad or there is something wrong. If there is
something wrong, it is just instantly obvious.
You just get so good at this, it’s almost totally
unconscious. But, yes, I paid attention. Some-
times I had trouble staying awake, but that’s
mostly old age, not the briefing. I have trouble
with the sermons at church too. Of course, the
pastors always complain about people sleeping
through the sermons, and my reply is, ‘‘If you
MILITARYOPERATIONSRESEARCH SOCIETY (MORS) ORALHISTORY PROJECT: A FOLLOW-
ON INTERVIEW OF E.B. VANDIVER, III, FS
Military Operations Research, V23 N1 2018 Page 83
were a more dynamic speaker, nobody would
be going to sleep.’’ But, yes, that was my job,
and I’m a good listener, and like to listen."
Now you may think I like to talk more, but
that’s because you guys are making me talk.
Ordinarily I’d just sit here and listen to you.
Mike Garrambone: That’s our job—to extract
good stuff. So, how did you negotiate all those
intense presentations?
E.B. Vandiver: That’s what we did. The brief-
ings here in the agency are standardized. We
don’t need any creativity in briefing here.Here’s
what you’re going to cover. We spent a long
time coming up with an exact format for that
thing. Me and Jim Treharne. When we finally
decided on what the final thing would look like,
and what the chart looked like that described it,
I autographed one and framed it and presented
it to Treharne and he kept it on his wall (hidden
behind a plant). I about drove him nuts over
that thing. But it was important. It was the
same thing with me and Shedlowski on the logo
for CAA, what goes on the top of the CAA brief-
ing chart. Shedlowski and I went around; we
must’ve made 300 different versions of that
thing. Some of them were very minute changes,
until I got it exactly the way I wanted it. I think I
may be a lot like President Trump in that way.
Apparently, he does things like this too, drives
people nuts, but it’s important. ‘‘Who cares
what it looks like?’’ It makes a difference. I
wanted my view graphs and my reports to be
instantly recognizable as CAA and always look
the same.
Mike Garrambone: What do you recommend
to others that have to build and deliver these an-
alytical briefings?
E.B. Vandiver: The key thing is what you do
for your own internal briefings, and what you
do for external briefings are not necessarily the
same. Your internal briefings are to make sure
you’ve responded to questions asked, you’ve
done it using the right kind of stuff, and the re-
sults are good, and you can stand behind them.
The customer, he doesn’t want to hear all that.
He wants to know: ‘‘Did you answer my ques-
tion?’’ and ‘‘Can I believe this?’’ That’s what
he wants to know. So that calls for a different
kind of briefing that focuses on: ‘‘Here’s the
questions you asked. Here’s howwewent about
doing it - but don’t spend much time on that.
And here are the answers, and here are the
things we’ve done to make sure that these are
consistent with other works, other bodies of
knowledge and other data. You can trust what
we’ve done here.’’ That’s a totally different
briefing. Now a lot of analysts want to take their
internal briefing and go give it to the customer.
They find out that those guys don’t care about
the model or the data or how good the analyst
is. They don’t want to hear any of that. They just
want to know, did you answer my questions
and can I believe this. If you go in there and
try to tell them, ‘‘Here’s how I made this, you
want to know the time, let me tell you about this
clock I built.’’ They don’t want to hear that.
You’ll lose themwithin five seconds of the brief-
ing if you start in with that stuff.
Mike Garrambone: Do you do pre-briefs
here?
E.B. Vandiver: No. I never had stuff pre-
briefed to me. I go to the ARB and I want to hear
your briefing. I don’t want to be pre-briefed on
anything. That’s what they do in the building
(thePentagon).All the briefingshadpre-briefings.
I never did that.
Mike Garrambone: What do you think about
providing read-aheads?
E.B. Vandiver: I like read-aheads. It depends
on what it is—not for the ARB. Not from my
analysis group. For a lot of other things in the
building, a lot of them get pre-briefs; they don’t
want to go into anything cold.
Mike Garrambone: When I briefed the AMC
Commander, I saw that he already had binders
full of read-aheads with him and he reads all
that material before themeeting. He has his staff
do all this research on a topic before it gets
briefed to him.
E.B. Vandiver: RisCassi, with our first cut on
what he’d asked us to do about the Korean op-
erations, he said ‘‘This is great. Will you stand
behind this?’’ ‘‘A hundred percent.’’ He said,
‘‘Great. Give me another set of charts that look
just like this one. Take your logo off and put
mine on it.’’ He went off to brief the SecDef.
The only thing he wanted to know was, ‘‘Will
you stand behind this?’’ Now, is this foolish?
Daring? Take your choice. ‘‘We have a lot of ex-
perience doing this. This work is using our best
models, our best data, and our best judgment.
And, yes, we will stand behind it.’’
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Bob Sheldon: Do you have any comments
about your customers sometimes ignoring your
analytic advice?
E.B. Vandiver: Yes, at times. For instance, we
used to do a study called value-added analysis.
Andy Loerch used to run the thing. What value-
added analysis did was look at a new system,
comparing it to the one it replaced, to see if
the amount of money it would take to replace
it provided enough of an increment of perfor-
mance improvement to make it worthwhile.
Well, value-added analysis said the Crusader
artillery piece is an all-around bad idea, that it
nowhere near provides an increment of im-
provement that is worth the enormous cost it
takes to field the thing. We said the same thing
was true about the new attack helicopter: there’s
no way the improvement we would get would
justify the amount of money for that thing. Well,
we got thrown out of PA&E and we got thrown
out of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the
Army’s office. ‘‘This is the worst analysis I’ve
ever seen. Don’t ever bring value-added back
in. I don’t ever want to hear the name again.’’
Guess what? They both collapsed of their own
weight. In the end, the Secretary of the Army
was forced to cancel Crusader. Rumsfeld pub-
licly humiliated the Secretary of the Army over
killing the Crusader program, mainly because
Rumsfeld wanted it killed, and the Secretary
of the Army had gone to Congress to lobby to
keep it alive. Rumsfeld found out about it.
And as for the other system, the cost just got
so high, it collapsed of its own weight. So, yes,
and therewas a period of time therewhere parts
of the headquarters were just very anti-analysis,
and I was under severe attack from a number
of people who tried to replace CAA with their
own analysis community. But in the end, I
hung in there and those things all went away.
There’s nothing that beats persistence; abso-
lutely nothing.
I was the Director of CAA for 28 years. I told
you it took 20 years to make it work the way I
wanted it to. And now we have this fight every
three years, you’ve got to go do something else,
get out of your comfort zone, blah, blah, blah.
My opinion it’s all pure horse manure. There
is great value in institutional continuity in the
development of very in-depth expertise. And
yes, some people ought to do that job and move
on to the other things, but others ought to be
more specialized and get very good atwhat they
do. Now that’s the way the system worked be-
fore we started all this rhetoric where we’ve
got to turn everybody over every three years,
which I think is a very stupid and simplistic
way of looking at things.
Bob Sheldon: Were there ever studies that
you thought should be declined?
E.B. Vandiver: As the Director of CAA, I
alone reserved the right to refuse to do a study
if requested by a general officer or Senior Exec-
utive Service (SES). I worked very hard to never
say ‘‘no,’’ as I thought that a pattern of that ac-
tivity would hurt the OR community and
CAA in the long run. I always emphasized
working with the Sponsor to get greater clarity
on the question, rather than refusing.
Michael Shurkin: In your earlier discussion
of wargaming, you describe bringing it ‘‘back
to life’’ in 2006. Hadwargaming declined before
then?
E.B. Vandiver: We did a lot of man-in-the-
loop wargames in the late 1980s in an organiza-
tion called Contingency Force Analysis at CAA.
We looked at lesser contingencies. They didn’t
fit well in the big theater simulation so we war-
gamed them. We did a lot of wargames through
that period for different areas of the world: the
NATO flanks, different Third World countries,
the defense of Hokkaido, northern Norway,
things like that. In the spring of 1990 for Third
Army down in Atlanta, we wargamed their de-
veloping OPLAN on going to the defense of
Saudi Arabia from an invasion from Iraq. We
developed the concept of the operations, we de-
veloped the forces, we set up the terrain, andwe
wargamed it. Sowhen Desert Shield went down
in August 1990, we started wargaming that day,
because we already had everything in place. We
wargamed several cases the first week, and
there was a planning group that met on Satur-
days over at the Pentagon. Youwould think that
the first thing theywould dowould be to ask the
analyst to attend, but no, that was the last thing
that would occur to them. So I just elbowed my
way in and attended that meeting and briefed,
‘‘Here’s what we’ve done.’’ And then we got
a request to do different cases and different sen-
sitivities on it, and we did. I think we did about
two or three weeks of wargaming. By then I had
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another group who was setting up the theater
simulation model on the situation over there.
When that came on, I shut down the wargame
and went over to do the simulation. That was
probably the last wargame we ran in CAA until
the 2000s. Therewas another groupwithin CAA
that did the normal theater-level kind of analy-
sis. Sowebrought up the situation; itwas a small
theater, but that’s okay, we could adapt the the-
ater model to represent it, and with imagina-
tion, we could represent it fairly well. And we
ran it, and ran it over and over again up until
the day before the ground war started.
Bob Sheldon: That was the CEM?
E.B. Vandiver: That was CEM. CEMwas crit-
icized for being a piston model, but so what?
You don’t have to line it up like the front in
Western Europe or Korea. We could draw sec-
tors to go anywhere. So as the OPLAN evolved,
we would create sectors that describe that ma-
neuver, and we even created a sector to bring
in an amphibious operation. Why not? Let’s
have a sector out in the water. It works. So as I
say, with imagination and a little creativity, we
made it work.
Bob Sheldon: Was that a cold start getting
back into wargaming in 2006, or did you have
some people doing wargaming on the side?
E.B. Vandiver: We got back into wargaming
in 2005 after Dr. David Markowitz became my
new deputy. He was an avid wargamer, person-
ally playingmany of the commercially available
games. In the summer of 2005, he proposed us-
ing a theater-level wargame to train the large
influx of junior analysts that year who had lit-
tle knowledge of the military or warfare and
certainly not anything so esoteric as theater-
level conflict.He adapted a commercialwargame
depicting the historical Korean conflict of
1950–1953 as a training tool, setting up different
courses of action, disposition of forces, threat
responses, and other major factors to sensitize
the trainees to the nature of theater-level war-
fare. They played a series of games and were
preparing a new, simplified series when reality
intruded. The command in Korea had devel-
oped a new OPLAN, which meant we had to
run it in our theater-level simulation as part of
the TAA study to develop Army support re-
quirements. There is a large gap between an
OPLAN and its simulation in a theater conflict
simulation. This gap is filled by front end anal-
ysis, which can be done in a number of ways,
but as mentioned earlier, wargaming is one of
the best. The wargame that was planned for
a training exercise was thus employed instead
to help set up the new Korean OPLAN in our
theater-level simulation.
Now we come to 2006, and a number of
overlapping events occurred. One was the war
between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon in
August 2006, and the other was the request by
the command in Iraq responsible for equipping
and training the Iraqi Army for an estimate of
the needed size of the Iraqi Army after the US
left. We responded to this with a series of war-
games I described earlier in this interview.
Bob Sheldon: Was there a conscious effort to
keep wargaming alive then to go into the front
end analysis years later?
E.B. Vandiver: Yes. We ramped down com-
pletely on Iraq, and we had developed another
version of it for Afghanistan, but it was quite
different, because the scale is different and there
are other phenomena at work. We did a lot of
games for Afghanistan as well. But then that be-
gan to ramp down too. My view was, we don’t
have a lot of big theaters anymore. Korea—yes.
We know how to do Korea. We’ve got a lot of
strange stuff around the world. And we have
a lot of OPLANS for how to deal with these
things. So a good way to get into the develop-
ment of an OPLAN is with a wargame doing
front end analysis. Then, of course, you’ve got
a whole new raft of planning scenarios coming
out of OSD—they’re for all kinds of ash-and-
trash. You can run them in the theater simula-
tion, but not immediately. Here’s the way you
get it from PA&E or JCS. Okay, you’re to go to
the Horn of Africa, and you need to support
a peacekeeping operation in South Sudan, to
bring in food, water, whatever, and you’re
allowed an end-strength of so many people,
and you have a certain time frame in which to
do it, and you are allowed so much in the way
of combat forces for force protection.Well, that’s
pretty sketchy. So, okay, how are you going to
do this? Where are you going to set up the lines
of communication? Who’s going to operate it?
Who’s going to secure it? How are you going
to phase doing this? Howmany forces are going
to be needed? What are the threats along the
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lines of communication?What kind of forces are
going to be needed to secure the lines of com-
munication? Once we get there, how do we dis-
tribute this stuff throughout the country? What
do we need to bring in to do that? Can we hire
commercial trucking companies in the area to
distribute it? Of course you can, but you’ll lose
50 percent of it to the black market. Maybe 75
percent. Or are we going to bring in truck com-
panies and do it ourselves? We won’t lose as
much, they’ll still steal us blind as you go along,
but you havemuch better chance of actually get-
ting it out. Do we have to provide water? Do we
have to bring in reverse osmosis water purifica-
tion units (ROWPU) to do this, or dowe bring in
engineer well-drilling companies to do that. It
goes on and on. So we would do the front end
analysis. You can call it a wargame, but it’s more
like a structured time, distance, and forces de-
velopment; step-by-step to figure out how to
do it. There are usually alternatives. Okay, we
can bring it in on this Chinese railroad, or we
can bring it in by truck up out of Kenya. This
was a real case, by the way. So we did several
different alternatives on the thing, and we
did—not a complete troop list, but kind of
a manual version of TAA, calculating key re-
quirements. We’re given these distances, how
many truck units do you need, or this much wa-
ter that you’re going to supply to this many peo-
ple, how many wells or ROWPU, or whatever.
In water purification circles, once a year they
have a big contest among those units called
the ROWPU Rodeo. I am not making this up. I
was always fascinated by the ROWPU Rodeo.
Bob Sheldon: In 1990, you did wargames for
a while, and then you transitioned to the simu-
lation. Is that the same thing you currently do
with front end analysis, where you do the war-
game as a lead-in to the simulation?
E.B. Vandiver: Yes, it’s very similar. The fact
that we had done the wargames gave us every-
thing we needed to set up the simulation. Same
thing now. You do front end analysis, but you
may not need to bother to set up the simulation
either. It may be good enough right there. In
others, it won’t be. It will be the setup for the
simulation.
Bob Sheldon: Your sister service, the Navy,
they kept onwargaming a lot during that period
of time.
E.B. Vandiver: Yes, they did. It was primarily
politically motivated. BingWest up at the Naval
War College was running the GlobalWargames,
where they would bring in all the four-stars in
the world, and they would run these giant war-
games, and they would end up having every-
body worried about ‘‘Where are the carriers?’’
Actually, it was a pretty brilliant ploy on their
part. BingWest is one of the really great intellec-
tuals in the business, I think, and he is still going
strong. I used to have him out every year to
speak to CAA. He’s a fabulous speaker.
Bob Sheldon: I want to ask a personnel ques-
tion about the wargaming, both back in 1990
and 2006.Did you always strive to have a combi-
nation of the ORSAs and the people who were
more warfighter-oriented?
E.B. Vandiver:We tried to get a real mixture.
We tried to get experts on the area, people with
great in-depth knowledge of that part of Africa
or Asia, wherever we are. Ones that have real
expertise in the country, the geography and that.
Sometimes we get those from the State Depart-
ment, we get them from the office in OSDwhere
they deal with international matters, we get
them from foreign area officers, the intel world.
There are a lot of sources of that kind of exper-
tise. We would want to get intel people in who
were the ones who are knowledgeable about
who are the bad guys that are in the area—sort
of a hierarchy of badness of these people, and
what their capabilities are. And then we would
want to get a selection of operators from all of
the Services: Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force,
and Coast Guard, if necessary. A lot of times,
the Coast Guard was necessary. And then we
want to get a range of functional specialties:
loggies, combat types, transportation types.
When you’re doing the front end analysis, all
of these things are important, and nobody has
more than just a piece of the thing. But when
you put it all together, and they start talking
through this thing, after a while you get a really
good product that comes out of the process.
They come away from it thinking that, ‘‘This
was pretty well done.’’ We have done lots of
those for front end analysis for new scenarios
for OSD and JCS. Of course, Tom Allen was
our Sponsor in JCS. After they got rid of the
PA&E people who didn’t think we ought to
do theater analysis, then we got very good
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reception there too. But we had several years
there when the PA&E didn’t think anybody
needed to do theater analysis.
Bob Sheldon: Some of the war colleges and
command and staff colleges do computer-aided
wargaming, where they use a simulation to help
adjudicate decisions that aremade.What’s your
impression of that?
E.B. Vandiver: We started that up at the
Army War College in the late 1980s. LTG Shy
Meyer, when he was DCSOPS (before that, he
had been the Assistant Commandant of the
Army War College), wanted to put more rigor
into how the classes worked through their mili-
tary problems. They have these big wargames
up there, where they would have each of the
seminar groups work on different parts of the
problem. He thought the whole thing was sort
of antiquated—the way they were doing it,
and he wanted to put it on a wargaming basis.
I was charged to go up and help Colonel Ray
Macedonia get that started and support them
in doing that. They put together a simple kind
of wargame, but it served quite well as a driver
for this kind of exercise, sort of academic learn-
ing kind of exercise. It kept it moving. It forced
people to think more quantitatively. It forced
people to think in terms of time, space, and
forces. So that was considered pretty successful.
I don’t knowwhat’s happened to it since. I think
it may have atrophied, but it worked quite well
for some time.
Bob Sheldon: You said something earlier
about tactical and higher-level simulations. I
was under the impression that most tactical-
level simulations were done at Leavenworth.
Do you do tactical-level simulations here at
CAA?
E.B. Vandiver: We have, yes. We’ve always
run a two-level hierarchy. We have a tactical-
level simulation that develops attrition data
and other inputs that we put into the theater
model. That’s the COSAGE, which has been
through a bazillion different versions now in
30 or more years. It’s the same name, but every-
thing else has changed. In Desert Storm, we had
the only accurate forecast of how that thing was
going to go down. The reason for it was the two-
level hierarchy. Everybody else focused on the
Republican Guard divisions. They made up
a very small part of the Iraqi Army. Most of it
was like 1950s vintage Soviet forces. They didn’t
have night vision devices. They didn’t have
target acquisition devices. They had T-62 tanks.
When we ran our tactical simulation, we did it
two different ways. We did it for Republican
Guard divisions and we did it for ordinary,
vanilla-flavored Iraqi divisions. Even for the Re-
publican Guard divisions, we hugely out-
matched them. When you got to the other
kinds, it was a whole generation, or maybe
two generations mismatch. I mean, we could
just eat them for breakfast. Republican Guards,
you had to fight them, but we could fight them
and beat them fairly easily. When you put all
that into the tactical model, and you got the hor-
rendous slaughtering that we could do against
vanilla-flavored units, and pretty much against
the RepublicanGuards too, and thenwe laid out
the battlefield with our scheme of maneuver. So,
okay, what happens? We fight them where we
want to, at whatever force ratio we want to,
and we vastly outmatch almost everybody we
come up against. That’s why you had Iraqi units
trying to surrender to remotely piloted vehicles
and helicopters. Because we were just abso-
lutely slaughtering them. But not just on the
highway of death. Our final estimate was this
whole thing will last four to six days, and we
will have less than 1,500 casualties to US forces.
It came out to about four days, so it came out
fairly close.
Michael Shurkin: The others were much
more pessimistic.
E.B. Vandiver: Trevor Dupuy, the night be-
fore the ground war went down, said it would
take 30 days and wewould suffer 15,000 casual-
ties. He said that on national television.
Mike Garrambone: Were you ever able to
learn if your studies had an impact with the
Army generals that were running the war?
E.B. Vandiver: Yes. Later, I was able to talk
to LTG Yeosock at length about how useful
our studies were, and how much he thought
they tempered his view about how things
would go. But Schwarzkopf was just still, well,
around the building, they would call him
‘‘Schwarzkopf—the McClellan of the Desert.’’
He’s outnumbered. He needs reinforcements.
Of course, he retorted that these people calling
him that weremilitary fairies, so it got into some
good name-calling back and forth after a while.
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And then we did all kinds of special studies,
especially with Renee Carlucci here about
shooting down the Scuds, which apparently
we weren’t doing, but it didn’t really matter, be-
cause it kept everybody from panicking. It
looked like we were, but it wasn’t really, but it
was close enough, because the way they were
shooting them, they were within the fan of the
Patriot to shoot them down. So it looked like
we were knocking them down, and it calmed
everybody down. The fact that we weren’t actu-
ally shooting them down, to me is just sort of ac-
ademic. They accomplished the purpose. Same
thing with Israel and the Patriot battalion we
sent over there. I don’t know,maybewe actually
did shoot down one or mess it up. A lot of them
failed in flight. They just came apart. But any-
way, we were doing analysis day-by-day on
‘‘Are we going to run out of missiles before they
run out of Scuds?’’ And Reneewas doing that. It
was really cool. She had a spreadsheet that
would be recalculated every day, and make
a new estimate on the rate they’re firing and
how that’s drawing down their inventory, and
how we’re drawing down our inventory. It
was a very nice piece of work. It kept everybody
kind of calm, how we will be all right, because
on our side we were manufacturing new Patriot
missiles at the max rate, and we were dredging
them out of every unit everywhere in the world
and sending them over there.
Bob Sheldon: You talked about using Trevor
Dupuy to get historical data. Can you comment
any more about using historical data to support
your analysis?
E.B. Vandiver:We spent several years trying
to clean up the Trevor historical conflict data-
base to get it accurate. It was just so messy, it
took a lot of work to do. And then several ana-
lysts tried to do different kinds of analysis with
it, but we didn’t have all that much luck coming
up with anything very useful out of it. Trevor
had his theory about how all this data affects
things. Well, does it? Maybe it’s actually true,
and Trevor just didn’t do it well. But we were
not able to establish it.
Bob Sheldon:More recently, you used histor-
ical counterinsurgency data, and I think RAND
used that in a study.
E.B. Vandiver: We used that information
back in the one we did on sizing the Iraqi forces.
That was the only analysis available. Ever since
the end of Vietnam, I would ask the building,
the operations people, every once in a while,
don’t you thinkwe ought to be doing something
on counterinsurgency? The answer was always,
‘‘We’re never going to do that again.’’ I said,
‘‘I’m a student of history. You can’t make that
statement. You don’t know that.’’ ‘‘Oh yes we
do. We’re never going to do that again.’’ Well,
Jim Quinlivan ignored them. RAND gets some
things right. They allowed him to keep playing
with that. It was kind of his hobby horse. He had
developed this, ‘‘How many counterinsurgents
do you need per capita population in order to
prevail at different levels of counterinsur-
gency.’’ So we used that. That was one of the an-
alytical pieces of this framework we put
together. After it was all over and the dust had
settled, a different part of RAND did an evalua-
tion of force analysis, and they said we did it
all wrong, which is typical, like the auditors
who come out and shoot the wounded after
the battle is over. But I considered that effort
to be superficial. It was really beside the point.
The question was not whether it was right.
The question was whether it was useful. And
the question was, ‘‘As opposed to what? What’s
going to get used otherwise?’’ And then the ar-
gument can be made, ‘‘Well yes, but it could be
misleading.’’ ‘‘No, it isn’t.’’ Because we explain
exactly every step we took, everything we did,
and we can vary everything in there to get sen-
sitivities on it, if youwant. There’s a lot of inertia
in these kinds of systems. They’re not as sensi-
tive as you might think they are.
Bob Sheldon: Let’s talk about another source
of data. You have the ranges in California and
elsewhere. Is that data useful for support of
CAA’s analytical efforts?
E.B. Vandiver: The Combat Developments
Experimentation Center (CDEC) data was ex-
tremely useful for tactical-level modeling. It
was used throughout TRADOC and in our
own CAA tactical simulations. Experiments on
line-of-sight of weapons vs. targets gave us the
basis for all of those calculations forever. And
all the attack helicopter experiments allowed
us to develop the tactics that said, ‘‘You can only
break mask for so long before you have to get
down.’’ That is, for helicopters in hiding, you
had to get up, you had to get a target, fire, and
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get down. So we worked out all kinds of ways,
when one guy pops up, finds the target, tells
you, the other guy, he then pops up and fires.
We got all kinds of good combat information
like that. It was really very, very good work.
And then we had the big experiments the
Marine Corps ran, and Dick Wiles ran out of
Operations Research, Inc. (ORI). It was called
RECVAL, which was about combined arms
combat. It had ground armor, anti-armor, infan-
try, attack helicopters, and A-10 Warthogs, all
working together. It was huge. In fact, Walt
Hollis went out there to run around the thing
and said, ‘‘This doesn’t look like a test. It looks
like a war.’’ It was that big. In fact, I went out
and rode on an armored personnel carrier for
a trial. It was a lot of fun. CDEC didn’t have
any forces of its own, so they had to borrow
them. We had a large tank unit, actually we
had the biggest part of a tank battalion from Fort
Hood, Texas. It stayed there for quite a while.
Now, US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)
objected violently to sending their forces to this,
because it interfered with training. I talked to
a couple of the company commanders, and they
said, ‘‘I don’t know what this test is about or
what you’re going to learn out of it, but this is
the most fabulous training we’ve ever had.’’ It
was that kind of thing that led to the National
Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. I think
very directly the experience out at CDEC and
these big tests led towhat we did at theNational
Training Center.
Bob Sheldon:One of the things historians ad-
vise against is taking the wrong lessons from
history. Do you have any comments on that?
E.B. Vandiver: Bob Scales says, ‘‘We always
get accused of preparing for the last war.’’ He
says, ‘‘That’s not correct. What we actually do
is we prepare for the last war we liked.’’ Which
is very different. Scales could be a little caustic
about these things. He is a true defense intellec-
tual. I don’t know what we’re preparing to do.
We’re not finished fighting the last wars yet.
They’re still going.
Bob Sheldon: I’m going to ask another
personnel question. Before you went into CAA,
you were in DCSOPS. Forrest came from
AMSAA to CAA. How was his training com-
pared to yours for becoming the Director of
CAA?
E.B. Vandiver: Forrest was my deputy here
starting in 2002. I hired him away from Booz
Allen—made an honest man out of him, and I
got him into the SES as my deputy. After about
a year-and-a-half, the building snatched him,
and took him up to take Vern Bettencourt’s
place in the old tech advisor’s office—‘‘Van’s
old office’’—which used to really piss them off
that everybody still called it Van’s old office.
Vern went over to G6 and became an IT person.
Forrest ran that office in DCSOPS quite a while
during the war, dealing with a lot of the war re-
quirements. Then when the AMSAA Director’s
job came open, Forrest was selected for that, I
think by then General Ben Griffin, who was
the head of AMC, and he wanted Forrest. So
Forrest went up there to take over AMSAA.
He had a pretty good background. He had three
jobs on my watch. He started with me as an SES
CAA deputy, left to serve on the G8 staff in the
old tech advisor’s job (DCSOPS), and then went
on to lead AMSAA before returning to CAA. So
he had pretty good training, a pretty good per-
spective on everything. It’s kind of hard to beat
it, actually.
Mike Garrambone: I am sure that with your
long tenure in leading analysis you must have
been accosted with ideas and methodologies
that did not always support your program—
perhaps they may not have had their intended
or advertised merit?
E.B. Vandiver: You recall my response to you
about the Quantified Judgment Methodology
(QJM). That was one of about a half-a-dozen
things that were kind of the bane of my exis-
tence the whole time I worked for the Army. I
ran into many methodologies that sounded
good on the surface, but actually had serious de-
ficiencies in one way or another. QJM was basi-
cally a model of what Trevor Dupuy thought
about warfare. It wasn’t necessarily a model of
anything in reality.
Models can be important but they can also
bring great confusion to analysis. For example,
you had the firepower scores—weapon effec-
tiveness index/weighted unit values (WEI/
WUVs), combat potential—as combat factors.
They’re useful if you stick close to the assump-
tions under which they are developed in the
cases from which they’re derived. But nobody
ever does this, and they always end up getting
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misused. So I just finally came down totally op-
posed to their use. When anybody would ask
CAA for them, I said, ‘‘Not no, but hell no!
You shouldn’t be asking.’’ Because as long as
they existed, they would be grossly misused,
primarily by OSD PA&E, whowould invariably
do a firepower score per dollar calculation,
and then conclude that we needed a whole divi-
sion of tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-
guided missiles or a whole division of multiple
launch rocket systems, which is just absolute
nonsense, because firepower scores are only
good within a very narrow range around the
point where they were generated. They are only
good as long as that mix of systems pertains.
Once you go to calculating a score per dollar,
this is just nonsense. I talked about QJM, fire-
power scores, and M&S was also a big one.
Some people believe that with models and sim-
ulations, we don’t need analysis anymore. And
this waswidespread because peoplewere so en-
amored of the graphics of these things, they
didn’t realize there was no underlying analysis
or logic to these things. They are just making
pictures. They’re great for making an exercise
run, but they have no validity in any analytical
sense. They had a giant conference in Huntsville,
Alabama, about M&S when we were really in
the throes of this thing and Walt Hollis was
one of the speakers. Somebody in the audience
askedWalt, ‘‘Do you ever useM&S in analysis?’’
I considered that probably the most perverse
question ever asked. Back then, the Army
M&S Office was in DCSOPS. DCSOPS didn’t
want the thing. Nobody really wanted it. So
DCSOPS eventually asked G8 if they would
take it over. The G8 askedme, ‘‘Would I manage
it if G8 took it?’’ I said, ‘‘I don’t really want the
thing, but if you want to bring the thing over
here, yes, I will do what you want me to do.’’
So we did. Of course, the M&S Office, knowing
how critical I was of them, thought that I was
trying to get a hold of it so I could murder it.
But it wasn’t true. I tried to give it the attention
that I could. It’s come along. I think we’ve done
a reasonably good job keeping it focused on the
Army and useful things. It got me more money,
more people, and another building, which has
a creek running through the basement. But
that’s another story. Yes, it does—it has a creek
running through the basement.
Mike Garrambone: I visited CAA around
1987 when you were still in Bethesda and I
asked about WEI/WUVs. Given their histori-
cal importance in Army analysis, can you tell
us the story behind WEI/WUVs and fire-
power scores?
E.B. Vandiver:Before the advent of theArmy’s
analytical community, the Army War College
did staff studies for the War Department Head-
quarters. With the formation of the Department
of Defense, theNationalWar Collegewas created,
which occupied the Army War College building
at Fort McNair while the Army War College
moved to a new building at Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania, in 1951.
Some of the staff studies were about poten-
tial theater conflicts. A wargame was created
that moved the front in sectors according to
the relative combat power of the two sides. All
of this was based on the experience of World
War II in the European Theater of Operations.
Combat power was computed using ‘‘firepower
scores.’’ These firepower scores were developed
by combat-experienced officers who judged the
weapon scores on an arbitrary scale set at one
for the M1 Garand rifle and 8,000 for the 8-inch
Howitzer. Enemy firepower scores were devel-
oped by relating those weapons to the most
comparable US weapons. The weapons in a sec-
tor were summed, then weighted by their fire-
power scores; the ratio of power between the
opposing sides was calculated, and the front
moved according to a table of movement rates
as a function of combat power. This table was
also judgmentally developed. I believe this sys-
tem was called simply the Theater War Game.
RAC produced a more refined version of this
for the Army War College in the 1960s called
the Theater Quick Game.
The Army STAG used this game and fire-
power scores for theater-level conventional
warfare analysis until superseded by the RAC-
developed ATLAS theater model in the late
1960s. CAA inherited the STAG models and
the firepower scores. When Mr. Rumsfeld be-
came Secretary of Defense (the first time) in
1974, he called for an assessment of the relative
strength of NATO and theWarsaw Pact. Mr. Dick
Lester in the DUSA (OR) office under Dr. Wilbur
Payne had theArmy lead on thisworking directly
with CAA. Mr. Lester spearheaded replacing
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the firepower scores with new scores that took
into account more factors and represented
weapons for which WWII experience simply
wasn’t applicable (e.g., precision guided mis-
siles and attack helicopters). The details of the
calculations are well documented in CAA pub-
lications of that era. Therewas a large amount of
subjective judgment involved, but there was
also a foundation of empirically based data on
weapon characteristics such as lethality, vulner-
ability, and mobility in the WEIs, which were
summed and further modified by readiness
and training factors (and others) to create the
WUVs. WUV were then used to estimate com-
bat power in a sector. At the time, this was con-
sidered a major improvement over firepower
scores.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, there
were a number of efforts to develop weapon
scores based on combat simulations, but these
always foundered on their dependence on par-
ticular scenarios. The Soviets were not so both-
ered, and developed their combat potential
scores using a division-level combat simulation.
Therewere characteristics of Soviet theater com-
bat theory that supported doing it this way.
They used their scores as part of their wartime
planning and command and control systems;
but I digress.
Therewere other evenmore elaborate scoring
systems developed later introducing many
more factors for which most of the coefficients
had to be judged. Mr. Dave Hardison, DUSA
(OR) 1975–1980 and Director of CAA 1982–
1984, derided these methodologies saying, ‘‘If
you have to guess all the inputs, why not just
guess the output. It is more honest, simpler,
and uses less time and effort.’’
Similarly, there were efforts to develop
methodologies for comparing weapon systems
for procurement purposes by enumerating the
major characteristics and weighting them to
produce a single number for each system. The
proponents of these methodologies always
countered criticism by saying, ‘‘If you don’t like
the weights, you can vary them and test sensi-
tivity.’’ Mr. Hardison had the same reaction to
these methodologies as he did to firepower
score kinds of methodologies. Dr. Payne’s criti-
cism was as barbed, but more humorous. He
called them, ‘‘The old a sub i, sub j game.’’
Neither of these kinds of methodologies has
gone away yet, but the same objections still ap-
ply. They are simply guessing, with a patina of
mathematics.
Mike Garrambone: It seems that the WEI/
WUVand firepower scores discussion was gen-
erated from a question about AMSO. Getting
back to AMSO, how has their mission evolved?
E.B. Vandiver: AMSO is primarily focused
onM&S used for training and exercises. The an-
alytical community develops and uses its M&S
independent of AMSO, but analytical M&S
provides the nucleus for much of the AMSO-
managed M&S.
Michael Shurkin: What did AMSO bring to
CAA? New capability and new resources?
E.B. Vandiver: It didn’t fit well. The kinds of
M&S they work with are primarily training
kinds of things, used for driving exercises. It
wasn’t a very good fit.
Michael Shurkin: It’s still with you.
E.B. Vandiver: I think it’s worked out reason-
ably well. It hasn’t really benefited either party
all that much. But nobody wants the thing. It
was ill-conceived to begin with. The whole
M&S business was ill-conceived to begin with.
And that’s why none of this stuff fits anywhere.
It was based on false premises to begin with,
that these things have some kind of indepen-
dent existence. When General Shinseki wanted
to create an M&S specialty, we argued strongly
against that. Just make that a subspecialty of
FA-49—ORSA. And then we get the rigor of
analysis to bear on the thing. ‘‘Oh, no. We’re
not even going to need analysis anymore once
we get this M&S going.’’
Bob Sheldon: Maybe you could compare de-
veloping M&S to live fire testing. The Services
used to do a lot of live fire testing, but now live
fire testing is so expensive, we don’t do much
anymore. One of my favorite historical exam-
ples comes from Art Stein’s oral history. After
World War II, they had a couple thousand air-
planes left over. Nobody needed them, so Art
Stein used them for live fire testing.
E.B. Vandiver: You used to be able to fly over
Aberdeen Proving Ground and see the wrecks
of those. I think they hauled them all off for
scrap. But that was a huge study.
Bob Sheldon:Art Stein did such a great study
that his data was used for years afterward.
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E.B. Vandiver: Joe Sperrazo killed 30,000
goats establishing wound ballistics data. Try to
do that today.
Bob Sheldon: M&S used to be developed
based on something somebody would go watch
field conditions and see how weapons were ac-
tually being employed. They would observe
real-life combat or field conditions and then
write that into their simulation models. Now
we don’t get too many field conditions where
we can observe real data. Your thoughts on that?
E.B. Vandiver: Read my speech about put-
ting the operations back in operations research.
I often ask the question, ‘‘What is this model
a model of?’’ Is this a model of something in
the real world? Or is this a model of the fevered
imagination of somebody writing code? All too
often, it’s the latter. We had an air defense sim-
ulation called the COMO (COmputer MOdel)
IAD (Integrated Air Defense) model, and
mostly it was used for flying in all the Soviet
hordes in the air. Then we’d fire all the air de-
fense missiles, or you could use it on a much
smaller scale. We had some exercises of using
air defense deployed up in the northern
counties of England (East Anglia and Northum-
berland), where they set up an air defense net-
work to look like parts of Europe, and then
flew in attackers simulating a Soviet air attack.
Of course, it’s all very scaled down. I tried to
get our guys, ‘‘Okay, go over there and let’s col-
lect data on this thing and let’s use it as a valida-
tion exercise for our simulation.’’ The person
who ran the simulation forme, whowas an elec-
trical engineer, said, ‘‘Why do we need to do
that? The model works great. We get good re-
sults. Everybody is happy with them. Why
would we want to do that?’’ With my usual
management finesse, I told him, ‘‘Shut up and
do it anyway!’’ So kicking and screaming, they
go over there and they get the data, and then I
made them come back, set that situation up in
the simulation and run it and see how it com-
pared with the exercise. The results were very
different. But their conclusion was the simula-
tion is right. ‘‘This is just one case, blah, blah.’’
That’s why I think the folks with the best prep-
aration for analysis are physicists, because they
have a very keen understanding of the relation-
ship of data to models. That’s the ‘‘modelitis
problem.’’ The model works, it gives good re-
sults, everybody’s happy with them. Why do
we need to validate anything?
Michael Shurkin: I have a question about us-
age of the termORSA. Some people are sticklers
on this, saying that ORSAs are only FA-49s, and
not 1515s or anybody else. Other people just use
it as a general term for anybody doing OR for
the Army. What do you think?
E.B. Vandiver: I think it really doesn’t matter
much. I prefer broader definitions. For me, if
you’re involved in analysis, you’re an analyst.
If you’re an FA-49, that’s fine; you’re techni-
cally an ORSA. Which I also don’t like that
name either, but it has historical roots and it
couldn’t be changed. But I don’t think it really
matters.
Michael Shurkin: Maybe I should use the
term ‘‘analysts.’’
E.B. Vandiver: I don’t think it really matters.
Michael Shurkin: Somebody’s going to jump
at me for the use of the term. I’m polling people.
Bob Sheldon:Analytics is another term being
used now, which is something different.
E.B. Vandiver: That’s something I’ve tried to
get them to work on here—big data and analyt-
ics. But nobody seems to understand what I’m
talking about. They don’t read Business Week
and the Wall Street Journal either.
You can just be careful about how you use it
and say ‘‘FA-49 ORSAs and people involved in
analysis to get around it.’’ Yes, some people love
to nit-pick these things, especially definitions.
Bob Sheldon: Given your decades-long expe-
riences with the Army’s development of analy-
sis andwargaming andM&S,what lessons from
the historical evolution of the Army’s analysis
and wargaming and M&S are most relevant to
today’s ORSA community?
E.B. Vandiver: Two fundamental consider-
ations apply. One: keep focused on military op-
erations (i.e., keep analysis reality based). Two:
base all analysis on real-world facts and data. I
understand the latter is not always fully possi-
ble. Do as much as you can. Fifty percent is still
much better than none.
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